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integrated bond markets. Our results show that credit spreads are higher for ABS than for public CB in both 
pre- and crisis periods. Considering bonds backed by mortgages, we only find evidence of CB credit spreads 
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by collateral type, credit rating is the most important pricing factor for AS bonds, and we document that 
not only specific effects related to issuance, but also macro factors and exogenous events are relevant 
drivers for CB credit spreads. Furthermore, while the first CB purchase programme led to lower mortgage 
CB credit spreads, the second programme did not have the ECB’s desired effects. Finally, we find that the 
ECB’s second programme reduces ABS spreads significantly for tranches issued by non-German banks. 
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1.  Introduction 
The transition from the traditional originate-to-hold model to the originate-to-distribute model, as 
well as its reliance on credit markets as a continuing source of credit, has been blamed by academics and 
practitioners for the 2007-2008 financial crisis [Brunnermeier (2009), Keys et al. (2010), Demyanyk and 
Van Hemert (2011), Purnanandam (2011)]. If the originator does not hold the credit it originates, but 
distributes the loan and its risks to other entities through asset securitization (AS), the incentive of the 
originator to monitor the credit granting process is reduced. Although recent studies point out that 
securitization played a relevant role in allowing financial institutions to solve liquidity and funding 
problems in the post-crisis period--namely as an active tool used to access various lending schemes by 
central banks [Altunbas et al. (2009), Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)]--, with the financial crisis several 
complex structured products like synthetic CDOs and squared CDOs may have disappeared forever. 
The reduction in the number of AS transactions after the beginning of the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
was accompanied by a growing demand for covered bonds (CB), a funding instrument that has been used 
in European countries for over a century.1 In fact, the European market for CB has significantly grown  in 
recent years, particularly when markets began to view AS instruments somewhat suspiciously and at the 
same time when liquidity in the markets was scarce, making it an important source of financing (or 
refinancing) for the European banking system. According to ECB (2008), CB have important features, from 
the perspective of financial stability, proving to be relatively resilient during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
principally when compared with AS. Moreover, CB are subject to tight regulatory control and are subject 
to preferential treatment under Basel III and Solvency II, which has increased its importance as a 
refinancing vehicle for European banks. This has led to several authors [Lucas et al. (2008), Bernanke 
(2009), Surti (2010), Carbó-Valverde et al. (2013)] proposing CB as a promising alternative to AS.  
AS and CB are economically significant financial market segments. According to the Association 
for Financial Markets, the volume of securitized assets in Western Europe grew from €78.2 billion in 2000 
to €753.9 billion in 2008, an increase of 864.1%. With the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the volume of AS 
bonds decreased significantly to €377.8 billion in 2009, a decline of 49.9% from 2008. In 2015, a total of 
€196.1 billion of securitized products were issued in Western Europe.2 According to Packer et al. (2007) 
CB issuance in Europe increased significantly from less than €100 billion in the mid-1990s to €350 billion 
                                                 
1 CB are a European product par excellence, which are more than 240 years old--in the 19th century, nearly every 
European country had a CB system--playing a fundamental role in bank funding as a competitive capital market 
instrument of long-term funding for mortgage or public-sector loans. For further development see, e.g., Packer et al. 
(2007), ECB (2008), Schwarcz (2011), Prokopczuk et al. (2013) and ECBC (2016). 
2 In the U.S., after a sharp decrease of 61.2% between 2007 (€2,404.9 billion) and 2008 (€933.6 billion), the volume 
of securitization products grew to €1,615.4 billion in 2015, an increase of 73.0%. There has essentially been no CB 
issuance by U.S. banks in the 2000-2012 period: €4 billion in 2006 and €8.86 billion in 2007. 
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in 2006. In 2010, for the first time ever CB issuance exceeded the issuance of senior unsecured bonds in 
the Euro market with a total issuance of €599.2 billion, decreasing to €497.2 billion in 2015.3 The 
development of the European market for CB was significantly increased by the ECB's extraordinary action 
implementing two Covered Bond Purchase Programmes in 2009 and 2011 (CBPP1 and CBPP2),4 and 
announcing more recently (September 2014) the third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3).5  
CB are hybrid financial debt instruments with characteristics of both senior bonds and AS bonds--
asset-backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS)--issued specifically by banks. The 
benefits of CB are similar to those of AS; both can access low-cost capital market funding with a low-level 
of risk for their investors, and both can be used to regenerate lending markets. Schwarcz (2011) emphasizes 
that CB should be viewed as a financing tool that belongs, as does AS, to structured finance: AS and CB 
are processes whereby financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and converted into 
negotiable securities to be placed in the market. Although in a traditional AS transaction the assets are 
transferred to a vehicle company created for this purpose through a true sale, in a CB cover-pool assets 
remain on the originator's balance sheet and investors have a priority claim against the collateral assets in 
case of default by the originators. 
Considering that CB and AS transactions have significant similarities and the fact that during the 
2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis the ECB relied on both 
instruments--three Covered Bond Purchase Programmes (2009, 2011 and 2014) and one Asset Backed-
Securities Purchase Programme (2014)--as a way to restore bank funding, enhancing the transmission of 
monetary policy and providing further monetary policy accommodation, we would like to raise two 
questions: (Q.1) How do common pricing characteristics compare between AS and CB? And (Q.2) to what 
extent are AS and CB priced by common factors? 
Compared to traditional securitization, CB have a dual protection nature since they are backed by 
a pool of specific underlying assets (such as high-grade mortgages or public sector debt), in addition to the 
issuer’s creditworthiness. Additionally, AS tranches carry large systematic risks. Considering that credit 
ratings ignore systematic risks and are constructed to reflect only physical default probabilities (S&P) or 
expected losses (Moody’s), securitized assets are expected to offer higher yields than similarly rated bonds 
[Hu and Cantor (2006), Coval et al. (2009), Wojtowicz (2014)]. Finally, CB are not subject to prepayment 
                                                 
3 Source: European Covered Bond Council (ECBC); www.ecbc.eu.  
4 CBPP1 was announced on 7 May 2009, under which the Eurosystem made outright purchases of CB to the nominal 
value of €60 billion from 6 July 2009 to the end of June 2010. On October  6, 2011 the ECB announced  CBPP2 of 
€40 billion in favor of euro-denominated CB in both primary and secondary markets.  
5 CBPP3 was originally scheduled until October 2016. Between 2014 and 2016 it was embedded in a broader asset 
purchase programme, including asset backed-securities, public sector bonds, and corporate sector bonds. In December 
2015, CBPP3 was extended to March 2017 and in November 2016 to the end of 2017. 
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risk and non-performing loans are replaced in the cover pool. Thus, CB have an associated  lower risk when 
compared with AS bonds [Schwarcz (2011), Szczerbowicz (2015)]. If CB are less risky than AS bonds, 
then the rates charged on AS bonds should be higher than the rates charged on CB. This raises a third 
question: (Q.3) Is the credit spread on AS bonds significantly higher than the credit spread on CB? 
Western European countries experienced two recent crises, the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. Given that the 2007-2008 financial crisis has somewhat 
tarnished the previously prevailing positive image of AS, as a process to help remedy deficiencies in 
financial markets, arising from incomplete capital allocation [Brunnermeier (2009), Shin (2009)], we 
cannot rule out that a flight to quality might have left many investors and intermediaries in the Western 
European countries credit-rationed. As a result, CB are being presented as the answer to securitization’s 
imperfections and we can verify a substitution effect between the use of AS and CB in the crisis period. 
Thus, issuers and investors might have also changed their attitude towards these debt instruments in terms 
of pricing and compensation. This brings to light one additional question: (Q.4) Are the credit spread and 
pricing processes of AS and CB significantly affected by the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis? 
According to Beirne et al. (2011), the CBPP1 led to a narrowing of CB spreads, which is consistent 
with the ECB objective of promoting the ongoing decline in money market term rates. Similar results were 
presented by Szczerbowicz (2015) for CBPP2. However, Schuller (2013) points out that the overall effect 
of CBPP2 on the spreads was a sharp difference between core Europe and distressed European countries, 
where the primary market virtually ran dry. Similarly, Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) find that while  CBPP1 
lowered the risk premiums of public CB, they do not verify a similar effect for CBPP2. Considering this 
empirical puzzle regarding  CPPB2 and that CB purchase programmes may have had an impact on the AS 
spread itself, we would like to raise one final question: (Q.5) What was the impact of the ECB’s covered 
bond purchase programmes on CB and AS bond credit spreads? 
To the best of our knowledge, no empirical study comparing the characteristics and pricing 
processes of AS and CB has  been published yet. Furthermore, the Western Market is, after the U.S. market, 
one of the largest markets for AS but it has been neglected by the existing literature. Similarly, despite the 
rise in importance of CB in Europe, they have not received significant attention--in fact, the main sources 
of market information have been yearly surveys by the European Covered Bond Council and research by 
rating agencies. We compile a large sample of 6,191 AS bonds and 11,471 CB issued by Western European 
banks between January 1, 2000 and October 31, 2012 to use in this study. There are few studies available 
that compare the influence of the determinants of AS and CB pricing factors and its influence on credit 
spreads. Thus, we consider this study an important contribution to literature research in this specific area, 
and in general to the literature on risk premia in bond markets, mainly by presenting a detailed analysis of 
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the influences of bond-specific factors, macro variables and exogenous events such as the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and the downgrade of Greece on April 24, 2010 on bond spreads. 
In addition, we contribute to the literature on the pricing of CB by studying CB backed by public loans and 
mortgages separately. Finally, our paper sheds some light on the puzzling role of the ECB’s CBPP2 
concerning CB spreads. 
We find that most of the common pricing characteristics in fact differ significantly, not only 
between AS and CB issues but also between ABS and public CB (PCB) and MBS and mortgage CB (MCB). 
Univariate analysis also shows a clear substitution effect between the two types of bonds in the crisis period 
and that the financial crisis increased AS bonds and CB credit spreads significantly: the average credit 
spread is economically and statistically higher for AS bonds (127.8 bps versus 75.7 bps) and CB issues 
(77.8 bps versus 18.3 bps) during the crisis period. 
Loan pricing regression analyses reveal that AS and CB issues are not priced in a single integrated 
debt market. Moreover, even ABS and PCB, as well as MBS and MCB are debt instruments influenced 
differently by common pricing factors. Considering AS and CB transactions as a whole, our results indicate 
that while in the pre-crisis period, AS bond credit spreads are higher than those of CB, in crisis period AS 
bonds have on average a 24.9 bps lower credit spread than CB. However, when we compare AS bonds with 
CB considering the bond collateral--public loans (ABS and PCB) or mortgages (MBS and MCB)--we find 
that credit spreads are significantly higher for ABS than for PCB in both pre- and crisis periods. Considering 
MBS versus MCB, our results indicate that while in pre-crisis period MBS have higher credit spreads, whereas 
in the crisis period we find that MCB are associated with higher credit spreads than MBS. Therefore, we do not 
corroborate the hypothesis raised by CB literature [Packer et al. (2007), Schwarcz (2011), Szczerbowicz 
(2015)] that the credit spread on CB is lower than the credit spread on otherwise comparable bond issues for AS 
and CB backed by mortgages during the crisis period. Similar results were obtained when we use the weighted 
average spread (WAS) instead of the credit spread to compare the cost of funding between AS and CB. 
Our results show that CB credit spreads are driven by collateral type: MCB have higher credit 
spreads than PCB. In line with previous empirical studies, we find rating to be the most important 
determinant of AS bond credit spreads at the time of issuance, which supports the prediction that investors 
might have based their investment decision almost exclusively on rating during the pre-crisis period. 
Regarding CB, we show that bond issues specific effects--bond maturity, number of participating banks 
and type of interest rate --, macroeconomic factors--country risk, the level of interest rates, the slope of the 
yield curve and market volatility--and exogenous events--financial crisis, sovereign debt crisis, and the 
ECB’s CBPP--are relevant drivers for credit spreads. 
Regarding the long-term effects of the ECB’s CBPP on CB credit spreads, we find, in line with 
Beirne et al. (2011) and Szczerbowicz (2015) that the first CBPP led to a narrowing of MCB credit spreads 
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in the Euro area. However, contrary to the results presented by Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016), we find that 
CBPP1 has an insignificant impact on PCB credit spread. For CBPP2, contrary to Szczerbowicz (2015) but 
in parallel with Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016), we find that the effect of the second CBPP--we find a 
significant positive relationship between the second CBPP and credit spreads for PCB and that the 
programme has an insignificant impact on MCB credit spread--is not consistent with the ECB’s objective 
of promoting the easing of funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises. Finally, we find that 
the ECB’s CBPP2 fed through into ABS prices: despite the fact that CBPP2 does not have an impact on 
MBS credit spreads, this programme led to the narrowing of ABS credit spreads issued by euro area banks, 
especially those located in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes DCM 
Analytics and Datastream databases used in this study, as well as the basic characteristics for the samples 
of AS versus CB. This section also compares the financial characteristics of AS issues with the sample of 
CB, and studies the impact of the financial crisis on credit spreads and pricing factors. Section 4 examines 
the determinants of credit spreads for AS and CB issues. We begin by presenting the methodology and 
analyzing the extent to which both debt issues are priced by common factors, followed by the regression 
results. Section 5 provides robustness checks using alternative and rearranged variables. In this section, we 
also conduct tests for potential endogeneity effects. Section 6 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature review 
2.1. The financial economics of asset securitization and covered bonds 
AS refers to a process by which an entity pools its interest into identifiable future cash flows, 
transfers the claims on those future cash flows to another entity created for the sole purpose of holding 
those financial claims--a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)--, and then issues negotiable securities. AS bonds 
are issued as subordinated, negotiable contingent claims (tranches) with varying seniority and maturity, 
backed by the credit payment performance of securitized assets.6 
CB have a long history in European debt markets and have been replacing AS bonds since 2009. 
According to the ECB (2008), ‘covered bonds are dual-recourse bonds, with a claim on both the issuer and 
a cover pool of high-quality collateral (which the issuer is required to maintain), issued under specific 
covered bond legislation (or contracts which emulate this)’. Concerning CB, the cover-pool of assets 
usually remain on the issuer’s balance sheet and are ‘ring-fenced’ to give bondholders greater protection in 
                                                 
6 For further details see, e.g., Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Jobst (2007), Gorton and Metrick (2013), Pinto and Alves 
(2016) and references therein. 
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the event of bankruptcy.7 As with AS, the structure and regulation of CB vary across countries. Structured 
CB are an example of a type of bond from the standard legislative CB. Structured CB are very similar to 
the AS technique as such transactions involve the use of an SPV that buys the cover-pool assets. However, 
even in a structured CB, bondholders have a residual claim on the bank issuer. 
According to Schwarcz (2011), the most important similarity between CB and AS transactions is 
that both endeavor for bankruptcy remoteness; i.e., both transactions are structured in order to protect 
investors in the event of an issuer’s bankruptcy. Additionally, in both transactions after bondholders are 
paid in full, any residual value from the asset pool is returned for the benefit of other creditors. There are, 
however, important differences between CB and AS [Packer et al. (2007)]. First, although in a traditional 
securitization transaction the assets are transferred to an SPV created for this purpose through a true sale, 
in a CB cover-pool assets remain on the originator's balance sheet. Second, CB investors have a full recourse 
right in case of a default by the originators. Thus, the financial institution issuing these securities, not only 
is responsible for its repayment, but it is also responsible for maintaining sufficient assets on its balance 
sheet in order to meet investor’s needs. On the contrary, in an AS transaction, the source of 
repayments/funds shifts from the cash flows of the issuer/sponsor to the cash flows generated by the SPV’s 
assets and/or a third party that guarantees the payments whenever cash flows become insufficient. If the 
assets are not sufficient to remunerate investors then junior tranches with low underlying credit ratings are 
the first to absorb the initial credit losses, protecting senior classes of potential losses through a 
subordination credit enhancement mechanism. In short, while an AS transaction is implemented as non-
recourse financing (off-balance sheet financing), CB have full recourse to the issuer in the event of collateral 
deficiency (on-balance sheet financing). Third, while in AS--ABS and MBS--the pool of assets is fixed or 
static, the cover pools are usually dynamic, requiring the covered bond issuer to continually segregate new 
assets as needed to maintain overcollateralization. Fourth, contrary to AS bonds, CB are not pass-through 
structures, as concerning CB it is not mandatory to have an exact match between the cash inflows from the 
underlying cover-pool assets and the cash outflows to repay the investors. Finally, another important 
difference is related to regulation; while CB issuances are subject to financial supervision, AS activity has 
been mostly beyond the directly regulated segments of the financial system. 
Existing literature presents the following main reasons for a bank corporation to issue both AS 
[Jones (2000), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jobst (2006), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), Cardone-Riportella et al. 
(2010), Casu et al. (2013) and Pinto and Alves (2016)] and CB [Packer et al. (2007), Surti (2010), Beirne 
                                                 
7 Ring-fencing here means that in a standard (legislative) CB transaction the cover-pool assets are segregated in order 
to protect them from claims of the issuer’s bankruptcy. In structured transactions, ring-fencing means, as for 
securitization, that the cover-pool assets are sold to a bankruptcy-remote SPV. See Packer et al. (2007) and Schwarcz 
(2011) for a distinction between structured and legislative CB regimes.  
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et al. (2011), Schwarcz (2011), Carbó-Valverde et al. (2013)] to: (i) increase liquidity and diversify funding 
sources; (ii) reduce the cost of funding; and (iii) improve the bank’s ability to manage funding and interest 
rate risk. However, and contrary to securitization, CB do not allow banks to transfer credit risk; obtain new 
profit opportunities, by recognizing accounting gains when the market value of the loans exceeds their book 
value; and to benefit from regulatory capital arbitrage by reducing risk-weighted assets, since cover-pool 
assets remain on the issuer’s balance-sheet [Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Calomiris 
and Mason (2004), Ambrose et al. (2005), Chiesa (2008), Affinito and Tagliaferri (2010)]. 
Despite the above-mentioned advantages, securitization also has shortcomings. Cardone-Riportella 
et al. (2010) and Jobst (2006) point out that AS transactions are fairly complex and involve a significant 
amount of due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. Additionally, there is a broad consensus about 
the important role played by AS in the development and propagation of the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
[Brunnermeier (2009), Shin (2009), Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011), Purnanandam (2011)]. Gorton 
(2009) presents asymmetric information problems as the major problem behind complex structures, which 
imposes a substantial agency cost on efficient AS transactions. Regarding CB, notwithstanding the benefits 
of CB when compared to AS, there are concerns that a high amount of bank assets, which are pledged to 
special creditors, and therefore would not be available in case of bank insolvency, would make banks more 
vulnerable in case of market turmoil and lead to further destabilization of the system. This idea is 
corroborated by Schwarcz (2011), who argues that CB are more likely to harm ‘non-adjusting creditors’. 
While in securitization the segregated pool of assets is typically fixed, allocating risk to all stakeholders, in 
CB the asset pool is dynamic requiring the issuer to continue to segregate assets as needed to repay the CB, 
in order of priority, vis-à-vis unsecured creditors. Additionally, funding loans via CB involves a greater 
outlay of capital by the issuer relative to the originate-to-distribute model, which, in turn, will lead to higher 
private borrowing costs. 
2.2 The determinants of credit spreads for asset securitization and covered bonds 
The existing literature on the pricing determinants of AS and CB is still very scant when compared 
with the large number of empirical studies available on the pricing of corporate bonds. Researchers [e.g., 
Collin-Dufrense et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), Longstaff et al. (2005), 
Chen et al. (2007), Bao et al. (2011), Flannery et al. (2012)] find that several factors are important 
determinants of corporate bond credit spreads, like credit rating, maturity, liquidity, systematic risk, 
incomplete accounting information, leverage and taxes. Market variables, like the level of interest rates, the 
slope of the yield curve, and market volatility, also have a significant impact on spreads. 
Referring to AS bonds, Rothberg et al. (1989) document that liquidity, credit risk, interest rate 
volatility and the term structure of interest rates affect the pricing of pass-through securities significantly. 
Maris and Segal (2002) and Hu and Cantor (2006) compare AS with corporate bond credit spreads and 
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document relatively higher credit spreads for AS securities. On the contrary, Pinto et al. (2017) find, using 
a European sample of AS and corporate bonds closed between 2000 and 2016, that ABS and MBS, but not 
CDOs, have lower credit spreads than corporate bonds. Maris and Segal (2002) study the determinants of 
spread for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) and find that default probability, tranche size, 
transaction size and year of issuance influence spreads. An et al. (2011) show that the default risk, the 
interest rate volatility, the slope of the yield curve, and the property-type composition of the underlying 
asset pool have a significant impact on CMBS spreads. Ammer and Clinton (2004) argue that credit rating 
is the most important pricing factor for this asset class at issue. This idea is corroborated by Hu and Cantor 
(2006), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and Buscaino et al. (2012). Vink and Thibeault (2008) examine how 
common pricing factors compare for ABS, MBS and CDO and find that they are influenced differently by 
common pricing factors. 
Academic literature on CB has focused mainly on the German covered bond market, due to its size 
and importance. Koziol and Sauerbier (2007) and Kempf et al. (2012) argue that German CB spreads are 
determined by liquidity only. Schäfer and Hochstein (1999) and Birkmeyer and Herbert (2002) show that 
variables such as the outstanding amount and credit rating affect jumbo CB credit spreads. In addition, 
Breger and Stovel (2004) find that while liquidity affects German CB credit spreads significantly, rating 
differences between AAA and AA are not significant. Prokopczuk et al. (2013) show that liquidity, credit 
quality of the cover-pool assets and whether they are covered by public sector or mortgage loans are 
important determinants of CB yield spreads issued by German banks. 
There are only two empirical papers which aim to study the determinants of CB spreads in 
international CB markets. Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012) demonstrate that developments in the real estate 
sector and legislative frameworks explain the pricing of mortgage CB during the financial crisis. Authors 
also demonstrate that country-specific differences exist and liquidity is an important determinant of 
mortgage CB credit spreads in both pre-crisis and crisis periods. Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) study the 
factors which influence risk premiums of public CB. In line with Beirne et al. (2011) and Prokopczuk and 
Vonhoff (2012), they find that whereas a higher interest rate level and a positive development of the stock 
market lead to lower risk premiums, high stock market volatility leads to higher risk premiums. Moreover, 
the development of real estate prices also influences risk premiums of public CB and both the financial 
crisis and the sovereign debt crisis increased public CB credit spreads significantly. Finally, authors find 
mixed effects regarding the impact of ECB’s CBPP on credit spreads: while the CBPP1 lowers risk 
premiums, the CBPP2 does not influence public CB spreads significantly. 
 
3.  Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
3.1.  Sample selection 
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Our sample consists of individual bond issues extracted from the DCM Analytics database. The 
DCM Analytics database (formerly Bondware database) is compiled by Dealogic and offers comprehensive 
information about public debt securities issued in relation to the debt capital markets. This database contains 
detailed historical information on virtually the entire population of bond securities issued in international 
capital markets and provides information on the micro characteristics of the bond offers (e.g., transaction 
and tranche size, maturity, currency, pricing, rating, type of interest rate) and of the issuers (e.g., name, 
nationality, industry sector). To select our samples of AS and CB issues, we extracted bonds issued by 
banks between January 1, 2000 and October 31, 2012. We explicitly chose October 31, 2012 as the end of 
our sample period as it corresponds to the end of the ECB’s CBPP2. 
Although the database extracted from DCM Analytics contains information on several types of 
bonds, we include only those with a “covered bond”, “asset-backed security”, and “mortgage-backed 
security” deal-type code. In CB, the cover-pool assets were primarily high-quality mortgage loans--
mortgage covered bonds (MCB)--and public sector debt--public covered bonds (PCB)--, whereas in asset 
securitization securities could be backed by consumer-backed products--asset-backed securities (ABS)--, 
by mortgages--mortgage-backed securities (MBS)--, and by debt obligations such as investment-grade and 
high-yield corporate bonds, emerging market bonds, MBS, ABS, bank loans, and other CDO--collateralized 
debt obligations (CDO). In order to compare AS with CB, we exclude CDOs and include ABS backed only 
by public sector loans and mortgages. Synthetic securitizations, through which banks transfer credit risk to 
third parties using credit derivatives or credit linked notes without removing the underlying portfolio of 
assets from the issuers’ balance sheet, are excluded from our sample. We exclude bond issues which have 
a “Non-US Agency” deal-type code, “corporate bond investment-grade”, and “corporate bond high-yield”. 
Perpetual bonds and bonds with additional features such as step-up, caps, or floors are also excluded from 
the database. We include bond tranches classified either as fixed rate bonds (with coupon rate information) 
or variable rate bonds (with both spread and index information). For variable rate bonds, only those quoted 
on the following indices are included: Euribor, Euro Libor, USD Libor, and GBP Libor. We also require 
that the issuer country is in Western Europe and that the tranche size (in Euro millions) is available. Finally, 
in order to take possible outliers into account we winsorize the data for transaction size and credit spread at 
the 1% and the 99%. 
After applying these screens, we are able to examine a total of 17,662 bonds (worth €4,730.9 
billion) issued by Western European banks located in 17 different countries.8 Our sample contains 
information on 6,191 AS issues worth €2,046.4 billion, of which 718 issues worth €174.8 billion have an 
                                                 
8 Western Europe includes in our database Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
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ABS deal type code and 5,473 issues worth €1,871.6 billion have a MBS deal type code; and 11,471 CB 
issues worth €2,684.5 billion, of which 6,292 issues worth €1,349.8 billion are PCB and 5,179 issues worth 
€1,334.7 billion are MCB. As the unit of observation is a single bond issue, multiple issues from the same 
transaction appear as separate observations in our database. We verify with Dealogic that our AS sample 
refers to securities sold to investors by bankruptcy-remote SPVs. 
In section 4, the credit spread on AS and CB issues is modeled as a function of microeconomic 
variables as well as macroeconomic conditions--the level of interest rates, market volatility, and the slope 
of the Euro yield curve. The data on macroeconomic variables are obtained from Datastream. We link the 
macroeconomic variables and the microeconomic information contained in the DCM Analytics database 
through the issue date. The main problem in choosing a set of variables for each type of issue is the 
requirement that each set must be meaningful for AS and CB. Several variables are available for the two 
types of bonds, which allows us to directly compare the main pricing factors for AS and CB issues. 
3.2. Univariate analysis 
In the univariate analysis, we examine and compare credit spread and common pricing factors not 
only among the two financing instrument types, but also among sub-categories that are directly comparable: 
ABS with PCB and MBS with MCB. The purpose is to provide insight into the common pricing 
characteristics associated with AS and CB. Table 1 presents basic characteristics for the sample of AS and 
CB while Table 2 provides t-tests and Fisher's exact tests comparing the values of each variable in the AS 
bond sample with the corresponding values in the CB sample; the values of each variable in the ABS sample 
with the corresponding values in the PCB sample; and the values of each variable in the MBS sample with 
the corresponding values in the MCB sample. Almost all of the pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically 
significant differences between the common pricing variables associated with AS and CB issues, as well as 
with ABS and PCB and MBS and MCB. 
**** Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here **** 
Credit spread corresponds to the price for the risk associated with the bond instrument at the date 
of issuance and is defined as the margin yielded by the security at the date of issuance above a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. Regarding the relative pricing of AS versus CB 
issues, Tables 1 and 2 show that the average credit spreads are economically and statistically higher for AS 
bonds (85.8 bps) than they are for CB (34.8 bps) at the 5% significance level. Similarly, ABS (109.8 bps) 
and MBS (82.6 bps) have higher average credit spreads than PCB (24.7 bps) and MCB (47.0 bps), 
respectively. Still, these univariate analyses do not allow us to control for other factors that are known to 
affect the pricing of bonds. Thus, in order to answer Q.3 we proceed, in section 4, with a regression analysis 
that takes micro and macro pricing factors directly into account. 
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Credit rating evaluates the capacity of the bank issuer to repay interest and principal on time as 
promised. We use a rating classification scheme based on 22 rating scales for two rating agencies. Bond 
ratings are thus based on the S&P and Moody’s rating at the time of issuing the bond, and converted as 
follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until D=22. Country risk is approximated by Standard & 
Poor’s country credit rating at the time of issuance. Similarly, this variable measures from 1 for the countries 
with the lowest risk (AAA=1) to 22 for the countries of highest risk (D=22). Other measures of country risk 
are available and have been used in other studies, such as the monthly data compiled by the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or the country risk rank provided by Euromoney magazine. The use of S&P’s 
country rating is justified, as pointed out by Erb et al. (1996), by its strong correlation with these alternative 
measures. Average credit ratings for CB (1.5) issues are significantly better than for AS bonds (4.5). This 
may suggest that AS transactions are riskier than CB. However, this can also reflect the country rating, 
since AS bank issuers are, on average, located in far riskier countries than in CB. Still, despite the average 
country rating for ABS issuers (1.4), which is significantly higher than the corresponding value for PCB 
(1.1), the average country rating for MBS (1.3) is lower than the one for MCB (1.4). This result coupled 
with the fact that average credit ratings for MBS (4.4) are significantly worse than for MCB (1.8) may 
indicate that mortgages included in the MCB cover-pool are of better quality (have lower credit risk) than 
those selected for including in the MBS pool of assets. This is in line with one of the benefits of CB which 
is most often referred to: concerning CB, the cover-pool assets remain on the originator's balance sheet, 
issuers have an incentive to maintain high quality assets on their balance sheets, giving a positive signal to 
the markets. 
The observed level of management fees and the number of participating banks also provide indirect 
evidence that MBS are relatively riskier than MCB. The average level of management fees for MBS (20.6 
bps) is significantly higher than the level for MCB (11.2 bps). The average number of banks participating 
in an MBS transaction is 3.1 and is significantly larger than the average of 1.9 for MCB. These findings 
suggest that the originator wishes to increase the number of underwriting institutions participating in a MBS 
transaction in order to spread risks. These findings can also be explained by the fact that MBS (€1,663.6 
million) transactions are significantly larger than MCB transactions (€260.1 million). 
While the average tranche size exhibited by ABS bonds does not differ significantly at the 5% 
significance level from the average tranche size exhibited by PCB issues, the average tranche size for MBS 
(€342.0 million) is relatively large when compared to the €257.7 million for MCB. 
Most of the remaining variables detailed in Tables 1 and 2 clearly suggest that AS and CB issues 
are fundamentally different financial instruments. While U.K. borrowers only represent 1.1% of the CB 
issues, they account for 45.1% of the AS bonds--a similar pattern is found when comparing ABS and MBS 
with PCB and MCB, respectively. On the contrary, German borrowers represent 78.2% and 10.3% of the 
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CB and AS issues, respectively. A significantly larger number of tranches per transaction are issued in an 
AS transaction. In a typical AS transaction, the average number of tranches per transaction is 4.9, which is 
larger than the average number of 1.0 for CB. Finally, the average tranche-to-transaction ratio for AS bonds 
(21.5%) is significantly lower than the tranche-to-transaction ratio for CB (99.2%). Thus, we can conclude 
that AS transactions may benefit from tranching to a larger degree and that CB transactions have typically 
one tranche per transaction only. Additionally, since in AS the pool of assets is static, this allows issuers to 
create a broader set of tranches that are backed by the pool, which allows bonds to differ in the timing and 
security of payment. An AS tranche of an average size matures in 33.5 years, which is a long period if we 
compare it with the average 5.4 years for CB. Similarly, ABS (25.2) and MBS (34.6) have higher average 
maturities than PCB (5.3) and MCB (5.5). This can be explained by the fact that contrary to CB, AS bonds 
have a pass-through nature that leads to maturity being virtually the same as that of the underlying pool of 
assets. In line with Packer et al. (2007) we find that unlike AS bonds, which tend to have floating rates and 
early repayments, CB generally pay fixed rates and have bullet maturities. Finally, only a small percentage 
of CB (5.2%) have currency risk, which reflects the importance of the euro-denominated CB market. 
However, this important difference comes from the fact that a significant percentage of MBS (21.2%) are 
issued with currency risk when compared with MCB (5.3%)--currency risk does not differ significantly 
between ABS and PCB. 
In summary, we find that most of the common pricing characteristics in fact differ significantly, 
not only between AS and CB issues but also between ABS and PCB and MBS and MCB. Table 2 shows 
that all pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences in value, with the exception of 
tranche size, number of banks, management fee and currency risk between ABS and PCB. Considering the 
financial instruments studied as a whole, we document that the transaction structures differ between the two 
types of bond issues, as well as other important univariate differences, namely: (i) AS average credit spreads 
are significantly higher than those of CB issues; (ii) both ABS and MBS have a significantly larger average 
transaction size than do PCB and MCB issues and AS transactions are issued with a significantly higher 
number of tranches, which have, on average, a lower credit rating vis-à-vis bonds belonging to PCB or 
MCB; (iii) AS bonds have much longer average maturity and are more likely to be arranged for U.K. 
borrowers than CB issues, which are more likely to be issued by banks located in Germany; (iv) MBS may 
be considered relatively riskier because both the average level of management fee and the average number 
of banks participating are substantially larger than the averages for MCB; (v) MBS are much more likely 
to be subject to currency risk and bank issuers are, on average, located in less riskier countries than in MCB; 
and (vi) CB issues are more likely to have  a fixed rather than a floating rate. 
We will examine bond pricing to a greater extent in section 4, when we employ an OLS regression 
to determine what factors influence the credit spreads of AS and CB transactions. However, our results 
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indicate that the common pricing characteristics differ significantly in value between the two types of bond 
issues. Therefore, we would expect the impact on pricing to be bond-specific. 
3.3. The impact of the financial crisis on credit spreads and pricing factors 
To answer Q.4, in this section we examine whether the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis significantly impacted the credit spread of AS and CB issues. 
We therefore investigate whether our univariate results are robust over time considering a pre-crisis period 
from January 1, 2000 through to September 14, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15, 2008 (the first 
trading day after the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing the day before) through to October 31, 2012. The 
first and significant conclusion that can be drawn from the analysis of Table 3 is that while the MCB market 
during the crisis period remained active--2,165 bonds issued in the crisis period versus 3,014 in the pre-
crisis period, a reduction of 28.2%--, there is a significant reduction of MBS issuance between the two 
periods (reduction of 78.4%). This result may be explained by the ECB’s CB purchase programmes. 
Additionally, the ABS market contracted less than the MBS market. 
**** Insert Table 3 about here **** 
Panel A of Table 3 provides z-statistics (Wilcoxon z-test) and almost all of the pair-wise 
comparisons indicate that equality of means for continuous variables can be rejected for AS and CB issues. 
There are three exceptions for CB issues: transaction size, tranche size and maturity. However, when we 
divide AS and CB samples considering whether the cover-pool assets are public loans or mortgages, we 
find that while the equality of means can be rejected for all MBS and MCB, credit rating and country risk 
variables do not differ significantly between pre-crisis and crisis periods for ABS. Similarly, the equality 
of means cannot be rejected for PCB credit rating. Similar findings are presented in Panel B of Table 3 for 
categorical (dummy) variables regarding AS and CB, which strongly support that the proportions of 
tranches differ significantly in the pre-crisis versus crisis period. For both ABS and PCB, we find that the 
proportions of tranches do not differ significantly between the two sub-samples pre- and post-crisis for 
currency risk and U.K. borrowers. Similar results were obtained for fixed rate only in MBS. The evidence 
strongly supports the assumption that the average credit spread is significantly higher for AS bonds (127.8 
bps versus 75.7 bps) and CB issues (77.8 bps versus 18.3) during the crisis period. These results hold for 
MBS, PCB and MCB but not for ABS: ABS average credit spread is lower during the crisis period. Thus, 
we can conclude that the crisis has a significant impact on AS and CB credit spreads. These simple analyses, 
however, do not allow us to control for other micro and macro pricing factors. We thus proceed, in Section 
4, with regression analyses where we are able to take these factors directly into account. Contrary to AS 
bonds (ABS and MBS) and MCB, the average maturities, transaction sizes, and tranche sizes of PCB have 
significantly reduced during the crisis period. This can be explained by the European sovereign debt crisis 
that led to a significant deterioration in the financing conditions of state-owned enterprises. 
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Taking the remaining variables, we are able to document the following important findings: (i) MBS 
and MCB issues have a significantly better credit rating during the crisis period when compared with the 
pre-crisis period; (ii) during the crisis period, with the exception of ABS, bonds in Western Europe are 
issued by banks located in far riskier countries, which can be explained by the European sovereign debt 
crisis; (iii) both AS and CB issues have a lower average number of tranches and thus a higher tranche-to-
transaction ratio during the crisis period than during the pre-crisis period, with MBS verifying a significant 
increase from 19.2% to 28.2%; (iv) while during the crisis period the number of banks involved in both AS 
and PCB decreased significantly, the opposite was found for MCB; and (v) during the crisis period while 
U.K. banks increased their use of MCB and reduced the use of MBS, German banks reduced the use of all 
bond types. 
 
4. Determinants of credit spreads for AS and CB issues 
In this section, we subject the various samples to an OLS regression analysis, with four objectives. 
First, we wish to determine which of the variables have a significant and independent effect on credit 
spreads once the effects of other variables are accounted for (Q.2). Thus, we start our analysis by 
determining if AS and CB are priced in the same way, which is the equivalent to testing whether AS and 
CB issues are priced in segmented or integrated debt markets. Second, we aim to determine whether AS 
(ABS and MBS) bonds are more or less expensive than CB (PCB and MCB), after controlling for other 
micro and macro pricing factors (Q.3). We then try to determine whether the 2007-2008 financial crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis impacts AS and CB credit spreads significantly--again, after 
controlling for other micro and macro pricing factors (Q.4). Finally, the impact of the ECB’s CBPP2  is 
particularly puzzling, so we analyze the pricing of our cross-section dataset of bond issues within a 
multivariate regression framework, focusing on the relationship between credit spread and the ECB’s 
CBPP1 and CBPP2, while controlling for other relevant micro and macro risk factors that also affect the 
credit spread (Q.5). 
We estimate the determinants of bond pricing using the model described in equation (1). The 
dependent variable is the credit spread, in basis points, and the independent variables are those presented 
and described in Table 4, which gives an overview of the variables and their expected sign, taking into 
consideration the existing empirical literature. 
**** Insert Table 4 about here **** 
We employ OLS regression techniques and adjust for heteroskedasticity. As the unit of observation 
is the bond tranche and due to time varying risk premia, we estimated standard errors clustered by both 








A Chow test for a structural break is used to investigate whether the credit spreads associated with 
AS and CB issues are influenced differently by common pricing factors (Q.2). In essence, we are testing 
whether the pricing factors used in equation (1) are significant in both AS and CB transactions and, if so, 
whether they have the same coefficient values. Considering that the Chow test statistic (93.1) is higher than 
the critical level, we conclude that AS and CB issues are distinct financial instruments. Even when we 
compare ABS with PCB (Chow test statistic of 48.1) and MBS with MCB (Chow test statistic of 65.9) our 
results indicate that the two bond types are financial instruments influenced differently by common pricing 
factors. Hence, they are not priced in a single integrated market and we cannot estimate the full sample of 
bonds in a single regression in order to examine the individual impact of each pricing factor on credit 
spreads (see section 4.2). 
4.1. Do AS bonds have higher spreads than CB? 
The literature suggests that one core reason for a bank to use securitization is the reduction in 
funding costs. Finnerty (1988), Caselli and Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006), among others, point out 
that making use of a transaction that is specifically structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing 
assets producing cash flows solely for supporting the transaction coupled with credit enhancement 
mechanisms like subordination and overcollateralization, reduces the cost of funding by allowing the issuer 
to obtain better credit ratings than it would by issuing senior unsecured debt. The same intuition is presented 
by Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988), Jones (2000), Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Jobst (2006): securitization 
offers a low cost and credible way for information about the firm’s receivables to be produced and provided 
to investors. Regarding CB, Packer et al. (2007) and Bertalot (2014) show that CB, like AS bonds, have 
significant lower spreads than senior, unsecured bonds, which can be explained by the dual protection 
nature that combines the obligation of the issuer with the added protection of dedicated collateral. However, 
to our knowledge, no empirical study comparing AS and CB spreads on an individual basis has yet been 
published. 
There are two important differences that should be stressed when directly comparing CB with AS. 
First, concerning AS the bank no longer bears the risk of the loans as they are transferred to an SPV, in 
relation to CB the covered pool is constantly adjusted to maintain the pool size. Due to this, more 
information about the contents of the pool of assets is available for asset securities investors than for CB 
investors and thus securitization transactions reduce information asymmetries. However, one potential 


























This may give banks an incentive to have loans in the asset pool which are more risk prone than investors 
perceive, which increases the risk of agency problems such as moral hazard. As an alternative, CB limit 
this problem as the bank must transfer a replacement loan from its general portfolio to the mortgage pool if 
a loan defaults. 
The existing literature on CB [Packer et al. (2007), Schwarcz (2011), Bertalot (2014), Szczerbowicz 
(2015)] present CB as less risky than AS bonds. In addition, Hu and Cantor (2006) and Coval et al. (2009) 
argue that securitized assets are expected to offer higher yields than similarly rated corporate bonds since 
AS bonds carry large systematic risks. In order to examine whether the credit spreads on AS bonds are 
higher than the credit spreads on comparable CB we use equation (1) and create one dummy variable set 
equal to 1 if the tranche is an AS bond (AS), and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, so as to directly compare AS 
and CB with the same collateral, we also include two dummy variables set equal to 1 if the tranche is an 
ABS (ABS) or a MBS (MBS), and 0 otherwise. Finally, we control for country and year fixed effects. 
Column 1 of Table 5 reports estimates of this equation for a sample of 6,191 AS bonds and 11,471 
CB issues. The results suggest that, controlling for credit rating, AS bonds in Western Europe are associated 
with higher spreads since the AS dummy variable is associated with a statistically significant 21.4 bps 
increase in credit spreads. In order to check whether this finding is robust over time, we estimate model [1] 
for pre-crisis and crisis periods. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show that while AS bond credit spreads are 
higher than those of CB credit spreads in the pre-crisis period (model [1a]), we find the opposite for the 
crisis period (model [1b]): the AS dummy variable is associated with a statistically significant 24.9 bps drop 
in credit spreads. Therefore, considering AS and CB transactions as a whole, we corroborate the hypothesis 
raised by existing literature [Hu and Cantor (2006), Coval et al. (2009), Schwarcz (2011), Szczerbowicz 
(2015)] that the credit spread on CB is lower than the credit spread on AS bonds for the pre-crisis period 
only. 
**** Insert Table 5 about here **** 
However, as our bonds are backed by different loan types, we re-estimated model [1] for two sub-
samples created according to whether the bond collateral consist of public loans--ABS or PCB--or 
mortgages--MBS and MCB. Columns 4 and 7 of Table 5 report regression results where dummy variables 
ABS and MBS--set equal to 1 if the tranche is an ABS or a MBS, respectively, and 0 otherwise--are included 
as additional variables. The results suggest that ABS and MBS dummy variables are associated with 
statistically significant 37.2 bps and 26.0 bps increases in credit spreads in models [2] and [3], respectively, 
meaning that both ABS and MBS have higher spreads than CB with identical credit ratings. 
In order to verify if these results are robust over time, we re-estimate models [2] and [3] for pre-crisis 
and crisis periods. We find that during the pre-crisis period credit spreads are significantly higher for ABS and 
MBS than for PCB and MCB. Considering the crisis period, our results indicate that while ABS credit spreads 
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are significantly higher than PCB credit spreads, contrary to what we expected--as during the crisis period the 
ECB implemented two CB purchase programmes (CBPP1 and CBPP2)--MBS have lower credit spreads than 
MCB: the MBS dummy variable is associated with a significant 45.2 bps drop in credit spreads. Therefore, we 
corroborate the hypothesis raised by CB literature [Schwarcz (2011), Bertalot (2014), Szczerbowicz (2015)] 
that the credit spread on CB is lower than the credit spread on bond issues with similar credit ratings for AS and 
CB backed by public sector loans and mortgages during the pre-crisis period and for ABS and PCB during the 
crisis period. Our results are also in line with the predictions of Hu and Cantor (2006) and Coval et al. (2009), 
who argue that securitized assets are expected to offer higher yields than similarly rated bonds since ABS 
and MBS carry large systematic risks. AS transforms pools of assets into securitized tranches characterized 
by different risk-return profiles; i.e., ABS or MBS are created based on a diversified collateral portfolio, 
which makes it possible to generate large volumes of highly rated AAA and AA tranches from lower rated 
collateral. For example, an AAA rated tranche backed by diversified consumer-backed products, basket 
with a subordination of 30% will only incur losses if 50% of corporates default (assuming 40% recoveries); 
i.e., an extreme systemic event. Considering that credit ratings ignore systematic risks and are constructed 
to reflect only physical default probabilities (S&P) or expected losses (Moody’s) [Wojtowicz (2014), 
Cornaggia et al. (2016)], investors should require higher yields when investing in AS bonds to compensate 
the larger systematic risks.  
Our results for MBS and MCB may reflect that in the crisis period mortgages included in the cover-
pool assets might be of less quality than those transferred via true sale to an SPV and given as a guarantee 
to investors in an AS transaction. This may also reflect the fact that MCB rating increases--via 
overcollateralization, liquidity risks, quality of the cover-pool assets and, sometimes, subordination--are 
much harder to achieve compared with securitization transactions due to the fact that the covered bond 
rating cannot be entirely detached from the rating of the bond issuer themselves. 
Finally, we check the robustness of our results by replacing the credit spread by the weighted 
average spread (WAS)--calculated as the weighted average between the tranche spread and its weight in 
the transaction size--as our dependent variable (see section 5.1) and our results remains largely the same. 
4.2. Determinants of credit spreads 
Table 6 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using a sample of 6,191 AS bonds and 11,471 
CB. We start by examining if there are significant differences in credit spreads between ABS and MBS and 
between PCB and MCB. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 6 report regression results of estimating models [4] and 
[5], where dummy variables MBS and MCB are included as additional regressors. The results suggest, 
contrary to what we expected, that (i) credit spreads in Western Europe do not differ significantly between 
ABS and MBS, holding other factors constant; and (ii) MCB have higher credit spreads than PCB. 
Considering that MBS and MCB are secured by the collateral of specified real estate property, we would 
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expect the credit spreads of bonds backed by mortgages to be lower than ABS and PCB credit spreads. 
These findings can be explained by the fact that, as shown in Table 1, MCB have a higher credit risk than 
PCB. Thus, considering that banks issuing PCB are located in countries with lower sovereign risk than 
banks that rely more on MCB issuance, the implicit government guarantee provided to PCB allows such 
banks to issue bonds with a lower credit spread. 
Then, a Chow test is used to investigate whether the credit spreads associated with each sub-
category of AS bonds--ABS and MBS--and CB--PCB and MCB--are influenced differently by common 
pricing factors. Considering that the Chow test statistics are higher than the critical levels--17.5 for ABS 
versus MBS and 22.9 for PCB versus MCB--, we conclude that ABS and MBS are debt instruments 
influenced differently by common pricing factors and that PCB and MCB are priced differently by micro 
and macro characteristics. We thus analyze the pricing of AS and CB separately for each bond sub-category, 
comparing the results presented in models [4a], [4b], [5a], and [5b]. 
The second line of Table 6 details the influence of log transaction size on credit spread, which is 
insignificant for ABS and PCB but negative and significant for MBS. On the contrary, credit spread and 
transaction size have a significant positive relationship for MCB. For MBS, this can be explained by the 
fact that larger issues are likely to be associated with less uncertainty and to have more public information 
available about them than smaller offerings. Regarding MCB, larger issues means higher asset pools on the 
balance sheet since the financial institution issuing these securities is responsible for maintaining sufficient 
assets on its balance sheet in order to meet investor’s needs. 
Tranche to transaction ratio behaves differently for AS bonds--ABS and MBS--and PCB than for 
MCB. As we expected based on empirical literature, spread and tranche to transaction ratio have a 
significant and positive relationship for MCB. The influence of tranche to transaction on credit spread for 
ABS and MBS is insignificant, suggesting that lenders do not associate an increase in tranche to transaction 
ratio with a significant reduction of credit risk. 
While credit spread and maturity are significantly positively related for PCB issues--in line with 
the intuition that lenders should get a higher remuneration for being exposed to risk for a longer period of  
time--, they show an insignificant relationship for AS bonds and a significant negative relationship for 
MCB. The coefficient value indicates that issuing a bond, with an original maturity one year longer than 
the mean, increases the credit spread by 1.2 bps for PCB but decreases the credit spread by 0.5 bps for 
MCB. For structured finance transactions, like project finance and leveraged buy-outs, the empirical results 
reported in other studies suggest a non-linear term structure of credit spreads--hump-shaped for project 
finance loans [Sorge and Gadanecz (2008] and convex for leveraged buy-out loans [Pinto et al. (2017)]--, 
so we augment our baseline multiple regression with non-linear maturity components. Results (not 
reported) show, as we expected, that for CB a linear positive relationship between spread and maturity 
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remains very significant. For AS, non-linear maturity terms have an insignificant impact on credit spreads, 
which can be easily explained by the fact that the maturity of the securities issued in an AS transaction 
typically matches the maturity of the assets used as collateral. 
The variable number of banks behaves differently for CB (PCB and MCB) compared to AS (ABS 
and MBS). While credit spread and the number of banks are positively and significantly related for PCB 
and MCB, they have an insignificant relationship for ABS and MBS. The need for a larger number of banks 
in arranging a CB transaction may possibly be associated with an increase in risk and thus an extra premium 
is demanded. Country risk is significantly positively related to spread for MCB, indicating that lending to 
a bank located in a country with a rating of BB+ (BB+=11) versus one with a rating of AAA (AAA=1) will 
increase the credit spread by 133.9 bps. Contrary to what we expected, credit spread and country risk have 
a significant negative relationship for bonds backed by public loans. This might be explained by the fact 
that banks located in countries with higher sovereign risk have to implement additional credit enhancement 
mechanisms (e.g., subordination and overcollateralization) to increase bond credit ratings and thus reduce 
credit spreads. As we expected, ABS and MBS on average do not have to pay an extra risk premium on 
fixed coupon rate issues in comparison with floating rate issues. Similarly, the impact of fixed rate on credit 
spreads is significant and positive for both PCB and MCB. This can be explained by the fact that while in 
AS bonds, coupons are mainly floating-rate, while CB coupons are predominantly fixed-rate (see Table 1). 
The influence of currency risk on credit spread is insignificant for ABS and PCB but negative and 
significant for bonds backed by mortgages. Such a mismatch in the currency where the deal is carried out 
and the currency where the CB is issued decreases the rate charged significantly by 14.0 bps and 6.8 bps 
for MBS and MCB, respectively. This can be explained by the European sovereign debt crisis that led to a 
euro devaluation. The introduction of a call option in an ABS issue increases the credit spread by 33.0 bps. 
These values can be understood as the premium that an ABS issuer has to pay to retain the right to redeem 
the bonds at some point before the bond reaches its date of maturity. However, the impact of callable on 
MBS, as well as on both PCB and MCB credit spreads is insignificant. As we expected, U.K. borrowers 
raise funds at a higher spread compared to borrowers from continental Europe in the MCB market. In 
addition, similarly to existing empirical studies, the U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable has an insignificant 
relationship with ABS spreads. However, U.K. borrowers and credit spread have a significant positive 
relationship for MBS. 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis have imposed a 
significant increase in credit spreads for MBS and CB issues. A transaction with the issue date or active 
date during the crisis period will have a higher average credit spread of 78.0 bps for MBS and 60.1 bps and 
68.8 bps for PCB and MCB, respectively. Moreover, contrary to our expectations, credit spread and crisis 
are insignificantly related for ABS. This can be explained by the significant reduction in the number of 
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ABS issues between the sub-samples of the pre-crisis and crisis period, from 489 to 229 observations (see 
Table 3). The credit crunch precipitated by the subprime mortgage crisis dramatically weakened the market 
for AS bonds and led to only the good transactions (with better quality collateral) and then less risk, being 
placed on the market. We believe that an analysis of the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on AS bond credit spreads presents an important opportunity for 
future research, mainly considering a broader dataset including ABS purchased by the ECB under the 
current ABS purchase programme, expected to be active till the end of 2017. The impact of the financial 
crisis on credit spread and pricing processes for ABS, MBS, PCB and MCB will be analyzed further in 
section 4.3. 
The -risk-free rate has an insignificant relationship with AS bond credit spreads, but a significantly 
positive relationship with CB credit spreads. Our findings for MCB diverge from those of Prokopczuk and 
Vonhoff (2012), who find for a sample of MCB issued by banks located in France, Germany, Spain, and 
the U.K that the risk-free rate has a significant negative impact on the pricing of bonds. Contrary to the 
results presented by Hu and Cantor (2006) and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), credit spread and the slope of 
the Euro swap curve, EUSA5y-Libor3M, have an insignificant relationship for AS. As expected, the 
relationship between credit spreads and the slope of the Euro swap curve is significantly negative for PCB 
and MCB, meaning a steeper Euro swap curve is associated with lower credit spreads. The variable volatility 
behaves differently for AS bonds than for CB. Credit spread and volatility are significantly positively 
related for PCB and MCB, but have an insignificant relationship for ABS and MBS. Our results for CB are 
in line with those of Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012), who found a significant and positive relationship for 
MCB, but different from those of Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016), who present an insignificant relationship 
between market volatility and credit spreads. Regarding AS, our results corroborate those presented by 
Pinto et al. (2017). 
Regarding the impact of credit risk on credit spreads, Table 6 shows the exact results expected; the 
higher the credit risk of the bond issue the higher the credit spread. A one unit increase in credit rating 
(corresponding to a downgrade from AAA to AA+) is associated with an increase of 15.9 bps, 16.8 bps, 
1.8 bps and 1.4 bps in ABS, MBS, PCB and MCB credit spread, respectively. Our findings are in line with 
previous empirical studies, which find rating to be one of the most important determinants of AS bond 
credit spreads, and also support the prediction that investors might base their investment decision almost 
exclusively on rating. As we expected, AS rated tranches have lower credit spreads than non-rated ones. 
Regarding CB, while there is a significant negative relationship between the rated variable and PCB credit 
spreads, the rated variable does not impact on MCB credit spreads significantly. Our results are in line with 
Prokopczuk et al. (2013) for MCB issued in the crisis period and with Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) for 
PCB issued by euro area banks for the rating*rated variable but not for the rated variable. Regarding MCB, 
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our results are in line with Prokopczuk et al. (2013) for specific sample periods--if the bond has credit 
rating, it does not affect CB credit spreads in the crisis period. For PCB, our results are in line with Gürtler 
and Neelmeier (2016) concerning the impact of credit rating on credit spread but diverge concerning the 
impact of the rated variable: non-rated PCB credit spreads do not differ significantly from those with credit 
rating. 
4.3. The impact of the financial crisis on PCB and MCB pricing processes 
Based on regression results presented in Section 4.2, we find that the 2007-2008 financial crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis have imposed a significant increase in credit spreads for 
MBS, PCB, and MCB, but the relationship between spreads and crisis is insignificant for ABS. To examine 
the impact of the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on AS and 
CB pricing processes (Q.4) we split our samples into a pre-crisis period from January 1, 2000 to September 
14, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) through 
to October 31, 2012. 
Model [4a] in Table 7 shows (comparing results for pre-crisis versus crisis period) that the 
coefficient of the rating*rated remains significantly positively related to credit spread. The coefficients of 
maturity, currency risk, risk-free rate, U.K. borrowers and rated become insignificant, while the 
coefficients of fixed rate and EUSA5y-Libor3M become significantly negatively related to credit spread. 
Thus, we conclude that the slope of the yield curve, which reflects the expectations of interest rate evolution 
in the future, affects the credit spread significantly. As expected, a positive slope reflects expectations of 
improved economic conditions and, consequently, lenders require lower credit spreads. A change in 
coefficient signs takes place for country risk and callable variables, which become significantly negatively 
related to credit spread. One could interpret this significant negative relationship between country risk and 
credit spread as evidence that in the crisis period only transactions with better quality collateral--or those 
with additional credit enhancement like further subordination and/or with a monoline guarantee--issued by 
banks located in countries with worse ratings than were accepted by the market. Finally, the introduction 
of a call option signals to the market that the transaction is of a higher quality, as it allows the SPV to 
repurchase the issued bonds in the future. 
**** Insert Table 7 about here **** 
For MBS (model [4b] for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples), while the coefficients of log 
transaction size, rating*rated and rated remain significantly related to credit spread, the coefficient of 
volatility becomes insignificant. We find that in the crisis period the tranche to transaction size has a 
significantly negative impact on credit spread, suggesting that lenders associate an increase in tranche to 
transaction ratio with a significant reduction of credit risk. This is in line with Diamond (1993), Winton 
(1995), and Glaeser and Kallal (1997), who argue that bank issuers exploit market factors to their advantage 
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by issuing different classes of securities--tranching--with different degrees of seniority. In an AS 
transaction, bonds are pooled into classes, each one representing a degree of subordination. Senior classes 
are larger and have absolute priority in the cash flows concerning subordinate ones, which are the more 
junior classes. Finally, the significant positive relationship between country risk and credit spread during 
the crisis period is not a surprise, as rating agencies downgraded sovereign ratings from several Western 
European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain).  
Regarding PCB, model [5a] in Table 7 shows that the coefficients of fixed rate and volatility remain 
significantly positively related to credit spread, while the coefficient of EUSA5y-Libor3M remains 
significantly negatively related to credit spread. The coefficients on currency risk, rating*rated and rated 
become insignificant. The insignificance of rated*rating and rated variables can be explained by the fact 
that almost all PCB were issued with a rating and more than 90% of PCB have a rating classification of A+. 
It is important to notice that under CBPP1 and CBPP2 minimum requirements concerning credit ratings 
were established in order for a CB to be eligible. In addition, we find that the coefficient of a number of 
banks becomes significantly positively related to credit spread, which means that a higher number of banks 
involved may mean a higher level of risk associated with the transaction. Finally, a change in coefficient 
signs takes place for three variables. The log transaction size, maturity and risk-free rate variables become 
significantly negatively related to credit spread. One could interpret this significant negative relationship 
between transaction size and credit spread as evidence of a positive price liquidity effect related to the size 
of the entire issue. The change in sign for maturity can be explained by the two ECB’s CB purchase 
programmes implemented in 2009 and 2011. Finally, the change in sign for the level of interest rates can 
be explained by the European sovereign debt crisis: it is expected that during a period of crisis the increase 
in the level of interest rates will mean an economic recovery and, as such, spreads will decrease. 
For MCB (model [5b] for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples), the coefficients of a number of banks 
(with a significant increase in the coefficient value), fixed rate and EUSA5y-Libor3M remain statistically 
significant. While the coefficients of risk-free rate, volatility, U.K. borrowers and rated variables become 
insignificant, the log transaction size, country risk, and rating*rated variables become significantly 
positively related to credit spread. Thus, we can identify a change in the type of factors that explain MCB 
credit spreads, from macroeconomic factors (the level of interest rates and market volatility) to default 
factors (country risk and credit rating). The significant positive relationship between country risk and credit 
spread during the crisis period can be explained by the sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, almost all MCB 
were issued with a rating during this period as the ECB only purchases rated CB under CBPP1 and CBPP2. 
The positive impact of transaction size on credit spread in crisis period can be explained by a liquidity 
shortfall in financial markets. The critical phase of the 2007-2008 financial crisis manifested a shortage of 
liquidity, which was reflected in a fall in asset prices below their long-run fundamental price and a 
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deterioration in external financing conditions. Finally, the insignificant relationship between 
macroeconomic variables risk-free rate and volatility and credit spread during the crisis period can be 
explained by the ECB’s CB purchase programmes, implemented as a way to restore bank funding, 
enhancing the transmission of monetary policy and providing further monetary policy accommodation. 
Based on our regression analyses, we find evidence that the 2007-2008 financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis does have a significant impact on both AS (ABS and MBS) and 
CB (PCB and MCB) pricing processes. Thus, the financial crisis substantially influenced the explanatory 
power of the regressions, as well as the coefficients of the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in 
significance). We corroborate our findings using a Chow test for a structural break, finding that the 
independent variables have different impacts on ABS, MBS, PCB and MCB credit spreads in the pre-crisis 
period vis-à-vis the crisis period. 
4.4. The impact of CBPP1 and CBPP2 on bond credit spreads 
When debt capital markets were recovering from the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the European 
sovereign debt crisis began. Contrary to the first crisis, which affected financial markets globally, the latter 
occurred only in the euro zone, more specifically in some euro area countries. This again led to a lack of 
investor confidence and, consequently, a possible increase in risk premiums during this period. In addition, 
because of the significant increase in the sovereign risk of some Eurozone countries (e.g., Portugal, Ireland, 
Italy, Greece and Spain) and taking into account the significant relationship between bank risk and 
sovereign risk, AS and CB credit spreads may have been strongly affected during this period. 
During these crises, the ECB announced two covered bond purchase programmes (CBPP) with 
similar objectives. The first CBPP (CBPP1) with the objective of supporting ‘a specific financial market 
segment that is important for the funding of banks and that had been particularly affected by the financial 
crisis’ [ECB (2010)]. This programme was announced on May 7, 2009, under which the Eurosystem made 
outright purchases of CB to the nominal value of €60 billion in both primary and secondary markets--from 
6 July 2009 to the end of June 2010. The second CBPP (CBPP2) was implemented with the objective of 
contributing to ‘(a) easing funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises and (b) to encouraging 
credit institutions to maintain and expand their lending to customers’ [ECB (2012)]. The CBPP2 was 
announced on October 6, 2011, under which €40 billion in favor of euro-denominated CB in both primary 
and secondary markets could be purchased.  
In order to investigate the long-term effects of the ECB’s CBPP on CB credit spreads, controlling 
for the two referred crises, we use equation (1) and create the following four dummy variables: (i) CBPP1 
set equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the announcement and implementation of the first CBPP (from 
May 7, 2009 through to June 30, 2010), and 0 otherwise; (ii) CBPP2 set equal to 1 if the CB issue date 
belongs to the announcement and implementation of the second CBPP (from October 6, 2011 through to 
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October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise; (iii) financial crisis set equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the 
2007-2008 financial crisis (from September 15, 2008--Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date--through 
to April 23, 2010), and 0 otherwise; and (iv) sovereign crisis set equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to 
the European sovereign debt crisis (from April 24, 2010--downgrade of Greece sovereign credit rating, 
which triggered broad market turmoil--through to October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise. Considering that the 
CBPP2 had a broader objective other than to merely support a specific financial market segment, we also 
implement the same methodology to examine the effects of the CB purchase programmes on AS bond credit 
spreads. 
Table 8 reports regression results where the previously referred dummy variables were included as 
additional regressors in the models to test for the presence of any effect of the ECB’s CBPP on CB and AS 
credit spreads. Column 1 of Table 8 reports estimates for a sample of 11,471 CB issued by Western 
European banks between January 1, 2000 and October 31, 2012. As we expected, the results suggest that 
both the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis increased CB credit spreads significantly, since both 
dummy variables are associated with statistically significant 73.8 bps and 76.3 bps increases in credit 
spreads, respectively. Results also show that while the first CBPP had a reducing effect on Western 
European CB credit spreads of 14.1 bps, the second CBPP is associated with a significant 10.0 bps increase 
in CB credit spreads. In order to check whether these findings are robust for Eurozone versus U.K. banks 
and for PCB versus MCB, we re-estimate model [6] for CB issued by banks located in Eurozone countries 
(model [7]) and then for two sub-samples created according to whether the cover pool contains public loans 
(PCB) or mortgages (MCB)--models [7a] and [7b]. Columns 2 to 4 of Table 8 show that while the CBPP1 
has been effective in meeting ECB objectives by lowering credit spreads of CB issued by Eurozone banks, 
particularly for MCB, the CBPP2 has not contributed to easing funding conditions for Euro area banks 
since the credit spread and CBPP2 dummy have an insignificant (MCB) or a significant positive (PCB) 
relationship. Finally, our results show that U.K. banks face similar spreads when issuing CB to banks 
located in continental Europe. 
**** Insert Table 8 about here **** 
Our findings are similar to those presented by Beirne et al. (2011) and Szczerbowicz (2015) for the 
impact of CBPP1 on MCB credit spread: the first CBPP led to a narrowing of MCB credit spreads in the 
Euro area. Contrary to the results presented by Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016), we find that CBPP1 has an 
insignificant impact on PCB credit spread. For CBPP2, contrary to Szczerbowicz (2015) but in line with 
Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016), we find a significant positive relationship between the second CBPP and 
credit spreads for PCB. In addition, we find that CBPP2 has an insignificant impact on MCB credit spread. 
Thus, our results regarding the second CBPP are not consistent with the ECB objective of promoting the 
easing of funding conditions for credit institutions and enterprises. These findings can be explained by the 
27 
 
fact that in the second programme the demand was significantly lower than the announced amount; whereas 
the planned amount was completely exhausted during the first programme, during the second programme 
the total amount of purchased CB only reached €16.4 billion of the €40 billion announced by the ECB. In 
December 2011, the ECB announced the three year jumbo Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) 
and settled its first tranche, with the second tranche being settled in March 2012, which had a longer impact 
on the euro-denominated CB market with a significant decrease of public issuance in 2011 and 2012.  
Regarding AS bonds--models [8a] and [8b] for ABS and MBS, respectively--we find that the 
CBPP1 does not contribute to a credit spread reduction for both ABS and MBS issued by banks located in 
the Euro area. However, despite the insignificant impact of CBPP2 on MBS credit spreads, this programme 
led to a narrowing of ABS credit spreads in the Euro area, which is in line with the ECB objective of easing 
funding conditions for credit institutions. We thus find, for ABS, that the ECB CB purchases fed through 
into other asset prices. 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1. Do AS transactions have a lower cost of funding than CB transactions? 
The existing literature on AS [Finnerty (1988), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jobst 
(2006)] presents the reduction in funding costs as one core reason for a bank using securitization. On the 
other hand, Packer et al. (2007), Schwarcz (2011), Bertalot (2014) and Szczerbowicz (2015) present CB as 
less risky than AS bonds. So far (section 4.1), we find that during the pre-crisis period credit spreads are 
significantly higher for ABS and MBS than for PCB and MCB. Considering the crisis period, our results 
indicate that while ABS credit spreads are significantly higher than PCB credit spreads, MBS have lower 
credit spreads than MCB. 
AS transforms pools of assets into securitized tranches--tranching--characterized by different risk-
return properties. Relying on different credit enhancement mechanisms, AS allows for achieving credit 
quality improvement. Most of the credit risk is thus concentrated in the first-loss equity tranche, which also 
provides the highest coupon. Essentially, in AS and contrary to CB, which are typically based on the 
issuance of a single tranche per transaction (see Table 1), the cost of funding is determined by the 
combination of the different tranches. Therefore, to analyze if CB have a lower cost of funding than AS we 
need to compare the total cost of funding for the whole transaction. We then use  the weighted average 
spread (WAS)--calculated as the weighted average between the tranche spread and its weight in the 
transaction size--as a measure of the total cost of funding. 
We examine if CB transactions have a lower cost of funding than AS transactions using the model 
described in equation (2) and create three dummy variables set equal to 1 if the transaction is an AS 
transaction (AS), an ABS transaction (ABS) and a MBS transaction (MBS), and 0 otherwise. The dependent 
variable is the WAS, in basis points, and the independent variables are those presented and described in 
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Table 4. We employ OLS regression techniques and adjust for heteroskedasticity. Due to time varying risk 




Table 9 reports estimates of this equation for a sample of 1,031 AS transactions, of which 168 
transactions have an ABS deal type code and 863 have a MBS deal type code, and 11,377 CB transactions, 
of which 6,244 transactions have a PCB deal type code and 5,133 transactions a MCB deal type code. Our 
results, using WAS as a measure of the entire cost of funding, corroborate our previous results when 
comparing MBS with MCB in both pre- and crisis periods: while MBS transactions have higher WAS than 
MCB transactions in the pre-crisis period, MBS transactions are associated with a statistically significant 
WAS decrease of 31.6 bps in the crisis period. Regarding ABS and PCB, results presented in section 4.1 
seem to be robust for the pre-crisis period since we find that ABS have higher WAS than PCB. However, 
WAS for ABS transactions do not differ significantly from that of PCB transactions during the crisis period. 
Therefore, we corroborate the hypothesis raised by CB literature that the funding cost on CB is lower than 
the funding cost on comparable AS transactions during the crisis period only. 
**** Insert Table 9 about here **** 
5.2. Further analyzes on the impact of the ECB’s CBPPs on bond credit spreads 
Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012) and Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) show that the country in which 
a CB is issued influences risk premiums. Specifically, Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) present significant 
pricing differences between PCB issued in Germany vis-à-vis Non-Germany countries. Although we 
attempt to account for this using several country-specific variables, it might be useful to further split the 
dataset with regard to country. As CB issued by German banks constitute the majority of the dataset and 
because the impact on CB credit spreads of the two CBPP by the ECB may have a differential impact on 
different countries belonging to the euro area, we check the robustness of our results obtained by splitting 
both PCB and MCB into CB issued by German banks and CB issued by Non-German banks. In addition, 
considering that the European sovereign debt crisis has significantly affected Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain, we also examine the impact of the ECB’s CBPP on CB credit spreads issued by banks 
located in these countries. Finally, once the ECB CB purchases fed through into ABS credit spreads, we 
extend these analyses to ABS. The results are shown in Table 10. 
**** Insert Table 10 about here **** 
Our results show that the first CBPP had a reducing effect on MCB credit spreads only, with a 





















Comparing Tables 8 and 10, the results are similar: the CBPP1 did not lead to a narrowing of PCB credit 
spreads and the CBPP2 dummy has an insignificant (PCB and MCB issued by banks located in Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain and MCB issued by non-German banks) or a significant positive (PCB 
issued by both German and non-German banks and MCB issued by German banks) impact on CB credit 
spreads. Again, we find that while the CBPP1 does not impact ABS credit spreads, the CBPP2 reduces 
ABS credit spreads significantly for tranches issued by non-German banks, especially for those located in 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. Altogether, our results obtained in section 4.4 hold for the 
different country-level sub-samples. 
5.3. Additional sensitivity tests 
We perform a number of additional robustness checks regarding the pricing of ABS, MBS, PCB 
and MCB. First, we check whether our results are affected by potential endogeneity of maturity choice. 
This could be the case if riskier borrowers are only able to issue shorter maturity bonds. We reject the null 
of no endogeneity of maturity for MCB only. Using tranche size and number of tranches as instrumental 
variables, we obtained consistent estimates of the coefficients, which confirm our main results reported in 
Table 6. Second, our models [4b], [5a] and [5b] are re-estimated after adding the management fees variable. 
We find an insignificant relationship with credit spreads for MBS, PCB and MCB. Additionally, we also 
replace the country risk with the Euromoney country risk scores. Finally, we divided maturity into two 
variables, ‘high maturity’ and ‘low maturity’, as suggested by Vink and Thibault (2008). Our estimates 
remain unchanged when we adjust the S&P’s rating scale and use the Euromoney country risk scores, and 
appear robust to the inclusion of rearranged variables controlling for specific contractual features of bond 
issues. Overall, these additional sensitivity tests further confirm the robustness of our results regarding the 
pricing of AS and CB. 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
We give the first detailed comparative analysis of credit spreads and pricing processes of AS versus 
CB transactions using a large cross-section of bonds issued by Western European banks between January 
1, 2000 and October 31, 2012. We show that not only AS and CB are priced differently by common pricing 
factors but also that asset-backed securities (ABS) backed by public loans and public CB (PCB) as well as 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and mortgage CB (MCB) are not priced in integrated bond markets. 
Our results also demonstrate that: (i) during the pre-crisis period, credit spreads are significantly higher for 
ABS than for PCB as well as for MBS vis-à-vis MCB; and (ii) in the crisis period, while ABS have higher 
spreads than PCB, MBS are associated with a significant 45.2 reduction in spreads vis-à-vis MCB. 
Our results are particularly relevant for issuing banks, investors and for monetary policy reasons, 
since we show that both AS and CB credit spreads are driven by collateral type and while in AS credit 
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rating is the most important determinant of credit spreads, in CB not only issue specific effects, but also 
macroeconomic factors and exogenous events are relevant drivers for credit spreads. We show that the 
2007-2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis both had a significantly 
increasing effect on CB credit spreads. Regarding the impact of the first and second covered bond purchase 
programmes (CBPP1 and CBPP2) by the ECB, the effects are mixed. While the first programme led to 
lower MCB credit spreads; the second programme did not reach the ECB’s desired objectives: we find an 
insignificant or a significant positive relationship between the second CBPP and credit spreads for both 
MCB and PCB. Finally, we find that the CBPP2 reduces ABS credit spreads significantly for tranches 
issued by non-Germany banks, namely those located in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain. 
The period of financial crisis was marked by the sharp reduction in securitization operations and 
the increase in CB issues. At the basis of this difference is the launch of the two CBPP by the ECB in 2009 
and 2011, which indicates that CB were in fact a substitute for AS. Despite the fact that CB are commonly 
presented as avoiding moral hazard problems raised by AS, because issuers often retain ownership of the 
cover-pool assets, securitization transactions can be, and increasingly are after recent legislative changes in 
the U.S. and Europe--e.g., the US’s Dodd-Frank Act, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
amendments (FAS 166 and 167) and the joint work between the BoE and the ECB identifying the 
impediments that may be preventing the emergence of a healthy securitization market in Europe and 
suggesting policy options aimed at mitigating them--, on-balance sheet. These changes require originators 
to retain a minimum amount of recourse, thereby keeping ‘skin in the game’ to minimize moral hazard. 
Additionally, in Europe banks typically buy the first loss tranche and retain the servicing obligations for 
securitized assets, thereby exposing them to the increased collection costs associated with defaults. Thus, 
both AS and CB constitute efficient secured funding alternatives available to financial institutions to obtain 
stable medium and long-term funding at competitive prices and to diversify funding sources in Europe. In 
taking both instruments together, banks have powerful instruments to effectively manage liquidity risk 
while transferring risks to investors through global capital markets.  
On January 22, 2015, the ECB launched its expanded Asset Purchase Programme (APP), a package 
consisting of the third CBPP (CBPP3), the Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme (ABSPP), the 
Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP). 
Monthly purchases in public and private sector securities amount to €80 billion on average--with the main 
goal of addressing the risks of a too prolonged period of low inflation in the Eurozone--and are intended to 
be carried out until the end of 2017. Answering our research questions including data of ABS and CB issued 
under the ECB expanded APP is an important avenue for further research. Further research could also 
explore how AS and CB changed the way banks manage their funding and liquidity and how these changes 
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Table 1: Univariate statistics - pricing features associated with AS bonds and CB compared 
 
This Table reports summary statistics for a sample of asset securitization (AS) bonds and corporate bond (CB) issues closed between January 1, 2000 and October 













Univariate analysis - continuous variables
Credit spread (bps) Tranche to transaction (%)
Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179 Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
Mean 85.8 109.8 82.6 34.8 24.7 47.0 Mean 21.5% 26.9% 20.8% 99.2% 99.3% 99.2%
Median 45.3 58 45.0 24.0 19.9 32.5 Median 7.6% 13.0% 7.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Std. Dev. 123.9 187.1 112.7 61.4 51.4 69.8 Std. Dev. 29.0% 29.6% 28.9% 6.8% 6.7% 7.0%
Transaction Size (€ million) Number of banks
Number 1,401 201 1,200 11,384 6,248 5,136 Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
Mean 1,556.4 916.4 1,663.6 236.2 216.5 260.1 Mean 2.9 2.0 3.1 1.9 1.9 1.9
Median 826.9 568.7 862.7 80.0 100.0 50.0 Median 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Std. Dev. 2,681.1 1,058.4 2,850.6 463.7 437.9 492.3 Std. Dev. 2.3 1.4 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.3
Tranche size (€ million) Number of tranches
Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179 Number 1,401 201 1,200 11,384 6,248 5,136
Mean 330.5 243.4 342.0 234.0 214.5 257.7 Mean 4.9 3.8 5.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Median 64.7 64.4 64.7 80.0 100.0 50.0 Median 4.0 3.0 4.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Std. Dev. 967.8 497.2 1,013 445.6 418.0 476.0 Std. Dev. 3.4 2.1 3.5 0.1 0.1 0.1
Credit rating [1-22 weak] Country risk [1-22 weak]
Number 5,757 656 5,101 10,364 5,842 4,522 Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
Mean 4.5 5.4 4.4 1.5 1.4 1.8 Mean 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.4
Median 3.0 5.0 3.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Std. Dev. 4.0 4.7 3.9 1.5 1.3 1.7 Std. Dev. 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.2
Maturity (years) Management fee (bps)
Number 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179 Number 155 13 142 656 483 173
Mean 33.5 25.2 34.6 5.4 5.3 5.5 Mean 20.5 19.8 20.6 9.6 9.0 11.2
Median 35.3 28.9 36.5 4.9 4.9 5.0 Median 13.5 10.0 13.5 8.0 8.0 10.0
Std. Dev. 15.8 13.5 15.8 3.8 3.8 3.9 Std. Dev. 25.1 25.6 25.1 6.0 5.3 7.3
Univariate analysis - dummy variables
Fixed rate Currency Risk
   N. of issues with data available 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179    N. of issues with data available 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
   N. of issues with dummy=1 129 54 75 9,771 5,450 4,321    N. of issues with dummy=1 1,189 28 1,161 592 315 277
   % of total available data 2.1% 7.5% 1.4% 85.2% 86.6% 83.4%    % of total available data 19.2% 3.9% 21.2% 5.2% 5.0% 5.3%
U.K. borrowers German borrowers
   N. of issues with data available 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179    N. of issues with data available 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
   N. of issues with dummy=1 2,790 48 2,742 123 36 87    N. of issues with dummy=1 639 191 448 8,969 5,668 3,301
   % of total available data 45.1% 6.7% 50.1% 1.1% 0.6% 1.7%    % of total available data 10.3% 26.6% 8.2% 78.2% 90.1% 63.7%
Variable of interest
Type of bond issue
Variable of interest
Type of bond issue
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Table 2: Tests of significance for the difference in values among AS and CB issues 
 
Table 2 provides t-tests for continuous variables and Fisher's exact tests for dummy variables comparing the values of 
each variable in the asset securitization (AS) bonds sample with the corresponding values in the covered bonds (CB) 
sample; the values of each variable in the asset backed-securities (ABS) sample with the corresponding values in the 
public corporate bonds (PCB) sample; and the values of each variable in the mortgage backed-securities (MBS) sample 
with the corresponding values in the mortgage covered bonds (MCB) sample. For continuous variables, # indicates that 
the values do not differ significantly between the two bond issues at the 5% significance level. For dummy variables, * 
indicates that the proportion of tranches for which dummy = 1 does not differ significantly between the issue class.  For a 




AS vs CB ABS vs PCB MBS vs MCB
Credit spread (bps) 30.44 12.13 19.75
Credit Rating [1-22 weak] 54.18 21.92 43.59
Maturity (years) 137.39 39.31 132.00
Tranche to transaction (%) -15.52 -65.30 -14.04
Country risk [1-22 weak] 2.71 6.90 -7.08
Transaction size (€ million) 18.40 9.35 17.00
Tranche size (€ million) 7.43 1.50# 5.54
Number of tranches 42.70 18.64 39.72
Number of banks 28.57 1.51# 25.77
Management fees (bps) 5.38 1.51# 4.32
Fixed rate 0.000 0.000 0.000
Currency Risk 0.000 0.234* 0.000
U.K. borrowers 0.000 0.000 0.000
German borrowers 0.000 0.000 0.000
Continuous variables: two-sample t-tests assuming unequal variances
Variable of interest
Type of bond issue
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values)
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Table 3: The impact of the financial crisis on the characteristics of AS and CB tranches 
 
This table reports statistics for characteristics of AS and CB tranches which are separated into two sub-samples: pre-crisis period (from January 1, 2000 through to September 
14, 2008) and crisis period (from September 15, 2008 through to October 31, 2012). AS sample is divided into two sub-samples created considering whether bonds are 
asset-backed securities (ABS) or mortgage-backed securities (MCB)CB sample is divided into two sub-samples created considering whether the cover-pool assets includes 
public loans (PCB) or mortgages (MCB). In Panel A, ***, **, * indicate that equality of means can be rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. In 
Panel B, * indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dummy variable and the financial crisis. For a definition of the variables, see Table 4. 
N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median
Credit spread (bps)
pre-crisis 4999 75.7 40.0 489 114.5 50.0 4510 71.5 37.0 8,303 18.3 17.0 5,289 17.8 16.8 3,014 19.3 17.6
crisis 1192 127.8 100.0 229 99.7 70.0 963 134.5 100.0 3,168 77.8 67.4 1,003 61.3 60.0 2,165 85.4 72.0
Transaction size (€ millions)
pre-crisis 1039 1,269.5 756.1 125 790.8 500.0 914 1334.9 796.2 8,227 215.9 100.0 5,249 222.7 100.0 2,978 203.8 50.0
crisis 362 2,379.9 1,117.6 76 1,123.1 900.0 286 2713.8 1259.3 3,157 289.1 50.0 999 183.9 50.0 2,158 337.8 75.0
Tranche size (€ millions)
pre-crisis 4999 244.7 51.2 489 194.2 41.6 4510 250.2 52.2 8,303 213.4 100.0 5,289 220.5 100.0 3,014 201.0 50.0
crisis 1192 690.5 242.0 229 348.4 167.5 963 771.9 264.7 3,168 288.1 50 1,003 183.2 50 2,165 336.7 77.2
Number of tranches
pre-crisis 1039 5.2 5.0 125 4.1 4.0 914 5.4 5.0 8,227 1.0 1.0 5,249 1.0 1.0 2,978 1.0 1.0
crisis 362 3.8 3.0 76 3.3 3.0 286 3.9 3.0 3,157 1.0 1.0 999 1.0 1.0 2,158 1.0 1.0
Credit rating [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 4,731 4.7 3.0 445 5.3 5.0 4286 4.6 3.0 7,332 1.5 1.0 4,880 1.4 1.0 2,452 1.9 1.0
crisis 1,026 3.7 1.0 211 5.6 5.0 815 3.2 1.0 3,032 1.6 1.0 962 1.3 1.0 2,070 1.7 1.0
Maturity (years)
pre-crisis 4999 31.3 33.3 489 23.3 24.0 4510 32.2 33.6 8,303 5.4 5.0 5,289 5.3 5.0 3,014 5.4 4.9
crisis 1192 42.6 42.0 229 29.4 32.7 963 45.7 42.7 3,168 5.4 4.9 1,003 5.0 4.0 2,165 5.5 5.0
Tranche to transaction (%)
pre-crisis 4999 19.8% 6.6% 489 24.9% 12.0% 4510 19.2% 6.1% 8,303 99.0% 100.0% 5,289 99.2% 100.0% 3,014 98.8% 100.0%
crisis 1192 28.8% 14.0% 229 31.1% 14.6% 963 28.2% 13.8% 3,168 99.7% 100.0% 1,003 99.6% 100.0% 2,165 99.7% 100.0%
Country risk  [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 4999 1.2 1.0 489 1.3 1.0 4510 1.2 1.0 8,303 1.1 1.0 5,289 1.1 1.0 3,014 1.3 1.0
crisis 1192 1.4 1.0 229 1.4 1.0 963 1.4 1.0 3,168 1.5 1.0 1,003 1.3 1.0 2,165 1.6 1.0
Number of banks
pre-crisis 4999 3.2 2.0 489 2.3 2.0 4510 3.3 3.0 8,303 1.9 1.0 5,289 1.9 1.0 3,014 1.8 1.0




















pre-crisis 4999 117 2.3% 489 50 10.2% 4510 67 1.5% 8303 7,306 88.0% 5289 4,639 87.7% 3014 2,667 88.5%
crisis 1192 4 0.3% 229 4 1.7% 963 8 0.8% 3168 2,465 77.8% 1003 811 80.9% 2165 1,654 76.4%
Currency risk
pre-crisis 4999 1073 21.5% 489 25 5.1% 4510 1048 23.2% 8,303 370 4.5% 5,289 254 4.8% 3,014 116 3.8%
crisis 1192 116 9.7% 229 3 1.3% 963 113 11.7% 3,168 222 7.0% 1,003 61 6.1% 2,165 161 7.4%
U.K. borrowers
pre-crisis 4999 2413 48.3% 489 25 5.1% 4510 2388 52.9% 8,303 40 0.5% 5,289 35 0.7% 3,014 5 0.2%
crisis 1192 377 31.6% 229 23 10.0% 963 354 36.8% 3,168 83 2.6% 1,003 1 0.1% 2,165 82 3.8%
German borrowers
pre-crisis 4999 598 12.0% 489 155 31.7% 4510 443 9.8% 8,303 7,007 84.4% 5,289 4,862 91.9% 3,014 2,145 71.2%





























































































































Panel A: The impact of the financial crisis on the characteristics of AS and CB tranches - continuous variables
Panel B: The impact of the financial crisis on the characteristics of AS and CB tranches - dummy variables
Variable of interest






















ABS MBS PCB MCB ABS MBS PCB MCB
Dependent Variable
Credit spread
Spread at issue over comparable risk-free 




Natural log of the bond transaction size. 
Transaction size is converted into Euro millions 
when necessary.
Vink and Thibeault (2008) | Prokopczuk and 
Vonhoff (2012) | Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | Gürtler 
and Neelmeier (2016) | Pinto et al. (2017) |
-/I -/I -/I -/I I - ? +/I
Tranche to transaction
Ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size of 
a given bond issue.
Vink and Thibeault (2008) | Pinto et al. (2017) | -/I -/I + + I ? I +/I
Maturity Maturity of a bond, in years.
Vink and Thibeault (2008) | Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008) | Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | Gürtler and 
Neelmeier (2016) | Pinto et al. (2017) |
I -/I + + I I + -/I
Number of banks
The number of financial institutions participating 
in the bond issuance.
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) | Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) | Pinto et al. (2017) |
-/I - + + I I + +
Rated
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a credit rating 
from S&P or Moody's and 0 otherwise.
- - ? ? - - - +/I
Rating*rated
The interaction between rated and credit rating. 
Credit reating is the S&P and Moody's rating at 
bond issuance; the rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on until 
D=22.
+ + + + + + + +/I
Fixed rate
Dummy equal to 1 if a loan or bond is fixed price 
and 0 otherwise.
Vink and Thibeault (2008) | Pinto et al. (2017) | +/I +/I + + -/I I + +
Currency risk
Dummy equal to 1 for bonds that are denominated 
in a currency different from the currency in the 
deal's nationality.
Vink and Thibeault (2008) | Pinto et al. (2017) | +/I +/I + + -/I ? +/I ?
Callable
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a call option 
and 0 otherwise.
Fabozzi et al. (2006) | Kothari (2006) | Pinto et al. 
(2017) |
I I + + ? I I I
U.K. borrowers
Dummy equal to 1 if the bank issuer is located in 
the U.K. and  0 otherwise.
Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012)  |  Pinto et al. 
(2017) |
? ? +/I +/I +/I +/I I ?
Findings
Elton et al. (2001) | Ammer and Clinton (2004) | 
Firla-Cuchra (2005) | Hu and Cantor (2006) | Vink 
and Thibeault (2008) | ECB (2008) | Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) | ECBC (2009) |  Buscaino et al. 
(2012) | Prokopczuk and Vonhoff (2012) | 
Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | Gürtler and Neelmeier 
(2016)  | Pinto et al. (2017) |




Table 4: Definition of variables, expected sign, and findings 
(continued) 
 
The following characters mean: – = negative impact on the credit spread | + = positive impact on the credit spread | I = insignificant impact on the 
credit spread | ? = sign cannot be clearly determined | NA = information about this variable is not available. 




S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is 
converted as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and so 
on until D=22. 
Erb et al. (1996) | ECBC (2014) | Gürtler and 
Neelmeier (2016) |
I I +/I +/I ? ? -/I +/I
Risk free rate
The yield on a 3-month German Treasury bill at 
the time of signing the loan or issuing the bonds - 
a proxy for the general level of interest rates.
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) | Prokopczuk and 
Vonhoff (2012) | Pinto et al. (2017) |
 -/I  -/I - - -/I I + +/I
EUSA5y-Libor3M
The slope of the Euro swap curve, obtained as 
the difference between the five-year Euro swap 
rate and the 3-month Libor rate.
Hu and Cantor (2006) | Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) 
| Pinto et al. (2017) |
 -/I  -/I - - -/I I - -
Volatility
The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility 
Index (VIX). VIX reflects a market estimate of 
future volatility.
Gürtler and Neelmeier (2016) | Pinto et al. (2017) | + + I +/I I +/I + +/I
Crisis
Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the 
crisis period and 0 otherwise. The pre-crisis 
period includes loans and bonds closed between 
January 1, 2000 and September 14, 2008; the 
crisis period includes loans and bonds closed 
between September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' 
bankruptcy filing date) and October 31, 2012.
Brunnermeier (2009) | Benmelech and Dlugosz 
(2009) | Shin (2009) | Prokopczuk and Vonhoff 
(2012) | Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | Gürtler and 
Neelmeier (2016) | Pinto et al. (2017) |
+ + + + I + + +
CBPP1
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond was issued during 
the first European Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (from May 7, 2009 through June 30, 
2010) and 0 otherwise.
? ? - - I + I -
CBPP2
Dummy equal to 1 if the bond was issued during 
the second European Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme (from October 6, 2011 through 
October 31, 2012) and 0 otherwise.
? ? ? ? - I + +/I
Financial crisis
Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the 
2007-2008 financial crisis (from September 15, 
2008 through April 23, 2010) and 0 otherwise.
Beirne et al. (2011) | Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | 
Schuller (2013) |
+ + + + I I + +
Sovereign crisis
Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the 
European sovereign debt crisis (from April 24, 
2010 through December 31, 2011) and 0 
otherwise.
Beirne et al. (2011) | Prokopczuk et al. (2013) | 
Schuller (2013) |
+ + + + ? + + +
Findings
Packer et al. (2007) | ECB (2008) | ECBC (2009) | 
ECBC (2011) | Beirne et al. (2011) | Carbó-
Valverde et al. (2013) | Schuller (2013) | 
Szczerbowicz (2015) | Gürtler and Neelmeier 
(2016) |









Intercept 109.99 *** 120.50 *** 139.34 ** 120.35 *** 84.36 *** 126.68 *** 60.11 58.99 *** 165.88 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.361) (0.002) (0.000)
Log transaction size 0.13 -0.76 -0.98 1.95 5.72 *** -4.24 ** -1.18 -5.23 *** -0.58
(0.874) (0.401) (0.527) (0.168) (0.003) (0.018) (0.247) (0.000) (0.779)
Tranche to transaction -21.58 *** -6.47 -57.49 *** -64.40 *** -60.06 *** -62.64 *** -10.20 ** 4.48 -55.46 ***
(0.000) (0.222) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.033) (0.346) (0.000)
Maturity -0.20 -0.23 * -0.09 -0.22 0.60 * -1.83 *** -0.13 -0.10 0.19
(0.190) (0.079) (0.803) (0.446) (0.055) (0.000) (0.384) (0.306) (0.669)
Number of banks 1.86 *** 1.29 *** 7.58 *** 1.61 *** 0.69 ** 5.63 *** 1.73 *** 1.36 *** 7.31 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000)
Country risk 6.46 ** -3.43 9.45 *** -4.58 4.36 -11.17 ** 8.30 *** -8.73 11.11 ***
(0.033) (0.406) (0.004) (0.327) (0.403) (0.023) (0.008) (0.121) (0.001)
Fixed rate 11.92 *** 6.36 * 16.54 *** 11.31 *** 4.24 24.10 ** 16.30 *** 7.88 17.73 ***
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.006) (0.360) (0.016) (0.000) (0.231) (0.001)
Currency risk -16.48 *** -16.66 *** -8.59 1.48 1.64 -10.80 -20.12 *** -20.49 *** -8.44
(0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.768) (0.769) (0.174) (0.000) (0.000) (0.250)
Callable 1.33 1.01 -0.53 5.51 12.29 ** -8.12 -0.76 -3.53 2.59
(0.625) (0.725) (0.940) (0.257) (0.046) (0.451) (0.801) (0.166) (0.739)
Risk free rate -0.069 ** -0.079 ** -0.016 -0.056 -0.084 0.011 -0.078 ** -0.077 * -0.051
(0.017) (0.028) (0.773) (0.189) (0.138) (0.838) (0.035) (0.055) (0.471)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.19 *** -0.16 *** -0.28 *** -0.16 *** -0.16 *** -0.25 *** -0.19 *** -0.16 *** -0.27 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Volatility 0.18 0.46 ** -0.33 0.26 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.86 *** -0.33
(0.232) (0.011) (0.336) (0.139) (0.778) (0.645) (0.197) (0.003) (0.393)
Crisis -3.12 -4.80 -8.71
(0.789) (0.814) (0.487)
U.K. borrowers -16.00 *** -40.30 *** 49.65 -10.63 -21.94 12.56 88.42 -0.74 32.36 ***
(0.008) (0.000) (0.392) (0.414) (0.159) (0.702) (0.152) (0.944) (0.006)
Rating*rated 12.83 *** 14.56 *** 7.60 *** 8.47 *** 10.09 *** 6.13 14.41 *** 15.96 *** 8.43 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rated -39.75 *** -40.53 *** -37.66 *** -28.70 *** -34.22 -18.18 -48.24 *** -48.68 *** -45.41 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.350) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
AS 21.44 *** 39.24 *** -24.90 *
(0.000) (0.000) (0.080)
ABS 37.23 *** 29.98 ** 56.25 ***
(0.001) (0.021) (0.001)
MBS 25.99 *** 47.75 *** -45.23 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.010)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Ýes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 17,662 13,302 4,360 7,010 5,778 1,232 10,652 7,524 3,128
Adjusted R
2
0.33 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.37 0.42 0.29
MBS and MCB | 
pre-crisis period
MBS and MCB| 
crisis period
[3] [3a] [3b]
ABS and PCB | 
crisis period
MBS and MCB
[1] [1a] [1b] [2] [2a] [2b]
All bonds
All Bonds | pre-
crisis period
All Bonds | crisis 
period
ABS and PCB




Table 5 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of bond credit spreads for: (i) a sample of 6,191 asset securitization (AS) bonds and 
11,471 covered bonds (CB)--model [1]; (ii) a sample of 718 asset-backed securities (ABS) and 6,292 public covered bonds (PCB)--model [2]; and (iii) a sample 
of 5,473 mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 5,179 mortgage covered bonds (MCB)--model [3]. Modes are re-estimated according to whether bonds are issued 
in the pre-crisis period--between January 1, 2000 and September 14, 2008--or in the crisis period--between September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy 
filing date) and October 31, 2012. AS is equal to 1 if the bond is an AS bond and 0 if the bond is a CB issue. ABS is equal to 1 if the bond is an ABS and 0 if the 
bond is a PCB. MBS is equal to 1 if the bond is a MBS and 0 if the bond is a MCB. For a definition of the remaining variables, see Table 4. For each independent 
variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors clustered by year and transaction. We controlled for country and year fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads 
 
Table 6 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of bond credit spreads for: ( i) a sample 
of 6,191 asset securitization (AS) bonds--model [4]--and 11,471 covered bonds (CB)--model [5]; (ii) a sample of 718 
asset-backed securities (ABS) and 5,473 mortgage-backed securities (MBS)--models [4a] and [4b]; and (iii) a sample 
of 6,292 public covered bonds (PCB) and 5,179 mortgage covered bonds (MCB)--models [5a] and [5b]. MBS is equal 
to 1 if the bond is a MBS and 0 if the bond is an ABS. MCB is equal to 1 if the bond is a MCB and 0 if the bond is a 
PCB. For a definition of the remaining variables, see Table 4. For each independent variable, the first row reports the 
estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by year and transaction. We controlled for country fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote 












(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.307) (0.329) (0.002)








(0.000) (0.569) (0.000) (0.000) (0.299) (0.003)




(0.808) (0.726) (0.780) (0.034) (0.773) (0.000)






(0.318) (0.637) (0.249) (0.014) (0.000) (0.049)






(0.817) (0.862) (0.788) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)








(0.975) (0.023) (0.487) (0.000) (0.056) (0.000)


















3.45 3.50 -1.10 5.54
(0.093) (0.041) (0.350) (0.154) (0.714) (0.192)






(0.839) (0.356) (0.624) (0.000) (0.000) (0.036)






(0.301) (0.517) (0.407) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)





















































Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 6,191 718 5,473 11,471 6,292 5,179
Adjusted R
2















Table 7: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads--the impact of the financial crisis 
 
Table 7 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of credit spreads for asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities 
(MBS), public covered bonds (PCB) and mortgage covered bonds (MCB) sub-samples created by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1, 2000 through to 
September 14, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) through to December 31, 2011. For a definition of the 
variables, see Table 4. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were 
estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by year and transaction. We controlled for country fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote 









MBS | crisis 
period
Independent variables:
Intercept -132.37 223.44 *** 246.71 *** 265.07 *** 8.00 182.75 ** -12.83 50.22
(0.294) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) (0.803) (0.020) (0.183) (0.478)
Log transaction size 24.44 4.06 -11.54 *** -18.84 ** 1.70 *** -3.45 ** -0.61 3.13 **
(0.141) (0.652) (0.000) (0.014) (0.010) (0.026) (0.592) (0.025)
Tranche to transaction 1.16 30.50 15.81 *** -39.20 *** -6.98 68.72 9.25 19.42
(0.973) (0.465) (0.003) (0.004) (0.612) (0.378) (0.111) (0.606)
Maturity 1.72 * -1.41 0.01 0.50 1.52 *** -1.85 *** 0.16 -0.52
(0.072) (0.403) (0.916) (0.451) (0.000) (0.000) (0.637) (0.224)
Number of banks -2.45 -6.92 -0.16 3.16 0.24 4.29 *** 1.75 *** 6.04 ***
(0.528) (0.513) (0.785) (0.488) (0.191) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Country risk 43.90 * -14.80 ** -28.92 *** 15.59 ** -11.88 -10.77 1.72 9.55 ***
(0.061) (0.011) (0.004) (0.045) (0.219) (0.155) (0.654) (0.004)
Fixed rate -34.10 -390.62 ** 5.18 -37.50 12.67 *** 37.19 *** 10.02 ** 17.03 ***
(0.495) (0.046) (0.864) (0.494) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000)
Currency risk -78.68 * 40.95 -16.61 *** 23.87 * 7.00 ** -4.58 10.76 ** -21.84 ***
(0.081) (0.246) (0.000) (0.068) (0.015) (0.468) (0.019) (0.000)
Callable 63.94 *** -62.26 *** -1.49 14.61 0.17 11.38 1.24 1.57
(0.008) (0.004) (0.584) (0.161) (0.956) (0.414) (0.797) (0.873)
Risk free rate -0.41 * 0.01 0.00 -0.10 0.07 *** -0.10 ** 0.06 *** -0.05
(0.065) (0.902) (0.913) (0.225) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.124)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.27 -0.31 * -0.11 -0.08 -0.10 *** -0.19 *** -0.11 *** -0.17 ***
(0.570) (0.083) (0.141) (0.496) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Volatility 0.91 -0.28 2.74 *** -0.16 0.53 *** 0.49 *** 0.27 ** 0.26
(0.558) (0.674) (0.000) (0.767) (0.000) (0.010) (0.034) (0.103)
U.K. borrowers 284.20 ** 70.63 -64.66 10.74 -30.63 -35.33 *** 38.95
(0.036) (0.119) (0.108) (0.729) (0.122) (0.000) (0.480)
Rating*rated 19.97 *** 10.39 *** 18.30 *** 13.16 *** 1.96 *** 1.86 0.50 2.93 **
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.228) (0.353) (0.013)
Rated -231.05 ** -124.70 -113.47 *** -76.65 *** -6.80 *** 1.07 6.32 ** -0.01
(0.023) (0.124) (0.000) (0.001) (0.004) (0.858) (0.045) (0.998)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 489 229 4,510 963 5,289 1,003 3,014 2,165
Adjusted R
2
0.30 0.31 0.49 0.38 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.26
[4a] [4a] [4b] [4b]
PCB  | pre-crisis 
period
PCB  | crisis period
MCB  | pre-crisis 
period
MCB  | crisis 
period
[5a] [5a] [5b] [5b]
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Table 8: The impact of the ECB’s CBPP on AS and CB credit spreads 
 
Table 8 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of bond credit spreads for: (i) sample 
of 11,471 CB--model [6]; (ii) a sub-sample of 11,348 CB issued by banks located in the Eurozone--model [7]; (iii) 
two sub-samples of 6,256 public covered bonds (PCB) and 5,092 mortgage covered bonds (MCB) issued by banks 
located in the Eurozone--models [7a] and [7b]; and (iv) two sub-samples of 670 asset-backed securities (ABS) and 
2,731 mortgage-backed securities (MBS) issued by banks located in the Eurozone--models [8a] and [8b]. CBPP1 is 
equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the announcement and implementation of the first CBPP (from May 7, 2009 
through June 30, 2010), and 0 otherwise. CBPP2 is equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the announcement and 
implementation of the second CBPP (from October 6, 2011 through to October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise. Financial 
crisis is equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the 2007-2008 financial crisis (from September 15, 2008--Lehman 
Brothers' bankruptcy filing date--through to April 23, 2010), and 0 otherwise. Sovereign crisis set equal to 1 if the CB 
issue date belongs to the European sovereign debt crisis (from April 24, 2010--downgrade of Greece sovereign credit 
rating, which triggered broad market turmoil--through to October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise. For a definition of the 




Intercept -49.43 -64.36 *** -9.90 -73.74 *** 296.93 ** 163.11 ***
(0.329) (0.000) (0.580) (0.000) (0.017) (0.003)
Log transaction size 1.71 *** 1.73 *** 0.38 1.98 ** 10.41 -3.56
(0.001) (0.001) (0.537) (0.018) (0.388) (0.287)
Tranche to transaction 24.18 ** 21.96 * -7.54 42.38 *** -6.32 3.20
(0.029) (0.053) (0.645) (0.000) (0.780) (0.604)
Maturity 0.45 ** 0.45 ** 1.12 *** -0.54 ** -0.87 -0.01
(0.020) (0.021) (0.000) (0.040) (0.320) (0.962)
Number of banks 1.31 *** 1.38 *** 0.72 *** 2.33 *** -1.74 0.32
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.581) (0.794)
Country risk 8.77 *** 9.44 *** -16.75 *** 12.40 *** -2.97 -3.76
(0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.785) (0.789)
Fixed rate 15.70 *** 15.40 *** 18.89 *** 15.38 *** -82.46 -41.08
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.176) (0.371)
Currency risk -3.13 0.18 3.82 -3.82 -61.71 -7.89
(0.154) (0.935) (0.145) (0.326) (0.178) (0.436)
Callable 2.63 3.10 -1.64 6.68 38.54 ** 8.82
(0.286) (0.209) (0.585) (0.118) (0.033) (0.114)
Risk free rate 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.07 *** 0.05 *** -0.25 -0.06
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.145) (0.265)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.06 *** -0.06 *** -0.07 *** -0.07 *** -0.37 -0.16
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.303) (0.138)
Volatility 0.29 *** 0.26 *** 0.52 *** 0.14 -0.06 1.47 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.234) (0.957) (0.005)
U.K. borrowers 26.39
(0.587)
Rating*rated 1.75 *** 1.90 *** 1.64 *** 1.63 ** 15.68 *** 17.20 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000)
Rated 0.45 0.18 -5.12 ** 3.58 -190.51 ** -153.83 ***
(0.822) (0.927) (0.023) (0.245) (0.011) (0.000)
CBPP1 -14.14 *** -15.28 *** -3.40 -21.76 *** -11.67 75.93 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.760) (0.004)
CBPP2 10.03 ** 7.43 33.73 *** -1.51 -112.72 * 9.43
(0.033) (0.127) (0.001) (0.784) (0.094) (0.796)






















(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.356) (0.001)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 11,471 11,346 6,254 5,092 670 2,731
Adjusted R
2
0.28 0.26 0.17 0.33 0.25 0.40
CB | Western 
Europe




ABS | Eurozone MBS | Eurozone
46 
 
second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
clustered by year and transaction. We controlled for country fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 9: Regression analyses of the cost of funding: weighted average spreads (WAS) 
 
Table 9 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of bond weighted average spreads (WAS) for: (i) a sample of 1,031 asset securitization 
(AS) transactions and 11,377 covered bond (CB) transactions--model [9]; (ii) a sample of 168 asset-backed securities (ABS) transactions and 6,244 public covered 
bond (PCB) transactions--model [10]; and (iii) a sample of 863 mortgage-backed securities (MBS) transactions and 5,133 mortgage covered bond (MCB) 
transactions--model [11]. Modes are re-estimated according to whether bonds are issued in the pre-crisis period--between January 1, 2000 and September 14, 2008-
-or in the crisis period--between September 15, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) and October 31, 2012. AS is equal to 1 if the bond is an AS bond 
and 0 if the bond is a CB issue. ABS is equal to 1 if the bond is an ABS and 0 if the bond is a PCB. MBS is equal to 1 if the bond is a MBS and 0 if the bond is a 
MCB. For a definition of the remaining variables, see Table 4. For each independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row 
reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors clustered by year. We controlled for country and year fixed-




Intercept 29.56 11.01 119.67 * 54.41 ** 50.00 36.40 43.08 -0.22 38.99
(0.394) (0.319) (0.072) (0.027) (0.142) (0.191) (0.211) (0.984) (0.589)
Log transaction size -0.14 -0.67 -0.27 -0.56 0.33 -3.88 0.18 -2.34 ** 1.31
(0.883) (0.410) (0.835) (0.521) (0.703) (0.166) (0.914) (0.040) (0.506)
Number of banks 2.36 *** 1.44 *** 7.89 *** 1.40 *** 0.73 ** 6.89 ** 3.54 *** 2.48 *** 7.43 ***
(0.003) (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.028) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005)
Country risk 11.21 ** -4.58 9.81 -9.31 -11.64 -11.18 13.86 ** -2.27 11.89
(0.034) (0.451) (0.169) (0.144) (0.398) (0.243) (0.015) (0.674) (0.131)
Currency risk -6.49 1.30 -24.38 *** -6.56 -0.18 -21.91 * -6.17 0.62 -24.73 ***
(0.256) (0.748) (0.001) (0.328) (0.976) (0.095) (0.274) (0.835) (0.010)
Risk free rate 0.019 0.018 0.062 0.003 0.013 0.005 0.030 0.020 0.060
(0.525) (0.469) (0.479) (0.933) (0.732) (0.934) (0.401) (0.625) (0.368)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.14 ** -0.10 *** -0.20 -0.14 *** -0.12 *** -0.18 * -0.14 * -0.08 -0.23
(0.017) (0.003) (0.143) (0.001) (0.006) (0.071) (0.065) (0.204) (0.109)
Volatility 0.22 0.05 0.17 0.27 -0.013 0.54 0.32 0.15 0.15
(0.469) (0.849) (0.682) (0.275) (0.966) (0.137) (0.368) (0.570) (0.768)
Crisis 19.99 * 20.52 *** 14.51
(0.093) (0.006) (0.299)
U.K. borrowers 17.31 -3.25 19.45 22.84 ** 18.07 * 68.38 42.56 4.39 ** 39.68
(0.570) (0.427) (0.650) (0.029) (0.051) (0.362) (0.176) (0.034) (0.404)
AS 6.44 31.89 *** -26.80 **
(0.512) (0.000) (0.014)
ABS 32.26 ** 48.43 *** 2.76
(0.011) (0.003) (0.860)
MBS 1.09 32.85 *** -31.56 **
-0.92 (0.000) (0.013)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Ýes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 12,408 8,994 3,414 6,412 5,352 1,060 5,996 3,642 2,354
Adjusted R
2
0.26 0.09 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.13 0.31 0.10 0.24
ABS and PCB | 
crisis period
MBS and MCB
[9] [9a] [9b] [10] [10a] [10b]
All bonds
All Bonds | pre-
crisis period
All Bonds | crisis 
period
ABS and PCB
ABS and PCB | 
pre-crisis period
MBS and MCB | 
pre-crisis period










Intercept -48.54 -16.38 -57.03 -45.29 -40.72 *** -36.62 36.74 536.77 ** 71.18 **
(0.125) (0.422) (0.373) (0.104) (0.000) (0.408) (0.440) (0.049) (0.041)
Log transaction size -2.33 0.69 -6.47 5.78 *** -1.20 1.35 -12.47 ** 36.77 * -0.40
(0.429) (0.247) (0.149) (0.001) (0.155) (0.635) (0.024) (0.062) (0.916)
Tranche to transaction 13.90 -13.27 45.14 49.36 *** 2.74 41.73 ** 10.11 -42.15 5.93
(0.508) (0.513) (0.184) (0.001) (0.719) (0.012) (0.400) (0.718) (0.565)
Maturity 0.53 1.21 *** 1.81 -0.62 0.12 -2.06 *** -0.16 4.54 -0.29
(0.376) (0.000) (0.179) (0.104) (0.655) (0.007) (0.705) (0.189) (0.424)
Number of banks 2.81 *** 0.34 * 5.58 *** 3.28 *** 1.92 *** 6.34 *** -2.03 -32.99 -2.85 *
(0.000) (0.073) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.273) (0.104) (0.059)
Country risk -23.36 *** -22.13 ** 6.40 * 5.59 -5.38 6.33
(0.000) (0.041) (0.068) (0.276) (0.272) (0.313)
Fixed rate 11.54 19.69 *** -10.48 -12.93 ** 34.06 *** -40.13 *** -48.56 -231.42 -40.78
(0.112) (0.000) (0.441) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000) (0.117) (0.124) (0.274)
Currency risk -2.08 5.43 * -22.20 -10.04 ** 6.73 0.79 -59.94 -7.34
(0.706) (0.087) (0.250) (0.031) (0.275) (0.968) (0.375) (0.916)
Callable 27.84 -2.38 31.23 -5.51 -1.82 -9.71 8.14 46.02 11.80 **
(0.115) (0.430) (0.197) (0.510) (0.716) (0.372) (0.248) (0.281) (0.045)
Risk free rate 0.09 *** 0.07 *** 0.15 * -0.03 0.06 *** 0.06 0.08 -0.89 ** 0.03
(0.009) (0.000) (0.057) (0.234) (0.000) (0.137) (0.170) (0.044) (0.483)
EUSA5y-Libor3M 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.14 -0.13 *** -0.08 *** 0.02 0.11 -0.80 -0.06
(0.899) (0.000) (0.139) (0.008) (0.000) (0.743) (0.289) (0.212) (0.394)
Volatility 0.59 0.53 *** 1.38 * -0.27 0.41 *** -0.97 *** 1.55 *** 9.46 ** 0.47
(0.114) (0.000) (0.099) (0.276) (0.001) (0.007) (0.003) (0.046) (0.305)
U.K. borrowers 2.77 48.74 *** 99.58 ***
(0.654) (0.000) (0.001)
Rating*rated 8.68 ** 1.43 *** 8.10 * 3.34 0.66 4.65 * 13.16 *** 29.36 *** 12.55 ***
(0.029) (0.000) (0.098) (0.125) (0.194) (0.072) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Rated 17.78 -5.84 *** 49.19 -7.23 8.23 *** -11.66 -33.38 -526.81 ** -64.29 ***
(0.193) (0.010) (0.144) (0.411) (0.009) (0.302) (0.146) (0.016) (0.000)
CBPP1 9.99 -3.73 59.59 * -38.40 *** -8.71 ** -52.89 *** 24.56 -253.04 22.30
(0.581) (0.300) (0.087) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.197) (0.537) (0.161)
CBPP2 52.00 ** 33.35 *** 62.37 -7.67 17.14 *** -26.07 -71.09 *** -58.61 -168.19 ***
(0.019) (0.000) (0.208) (0.381) (0.001) (0.276) (0.001) (0.274) (0.000)




























(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.148) (0.024) (0.004)
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 624 5,668 263 1,878 3,301 946 527 191 442
Adjusted R
2
0.17 0.18 0.05 0.39 0.27 0.43 0.49 0.25 0.56
[8a] [8a] [8a]
ABS | Euro Non-
Germany
ABS | Euro 
Germany




PCB | Euro Non-
Germany
[7a] [7b]
MCB | Euro 
Germany
[7b]
MCB | Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain
PCB | Euro 
Germany
[7a]








Table 10 presents the results of an OLS regression analysis of the determinants of bond credit spreads for : (i) three sub-samples of 624 PCB issued by Non-German 
banks, 5,668 PCB issued by German banks, and 263 PCB issued by banks located in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain--columns 1 to 3; (ii) three sub-
samples of 1,878 MCB issued by Non-German banks, 3,301 MCB issued by German banks, and 946 MCB issued by banks located in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain--columns 4 to 6; and (iii) three sub-samples of 527 ABS issued by Non-German banks, 191 ABS issued by German banks, and 442 ABS issued 
by banks located in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain--columns 7 to 9. CBPP1 is equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the announcement and 
implementation of the first CBPP (from May 7, 2009 through June 30, 2010), and 0 otherwise. CBPP2 is equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the announcement 
and implementation of the second CBPP (from October 6, 2011 through October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise. Financial crisis is equal to 1 if the CB issue date 
belongs to the 2007-2008 financial crisis (from September 15, 2008--Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date—through to April 23, 2010), and 0 otherwise. 
Sovereign crisis set equal to 1 if the CB issue date belongs to the European sovereign debt crisis (from April 24, 2010--downgrade of Greece sovereign credit 
rating, which triggered broad market turmoil--through to October 31, 2012), and 0 otherwise. For a definition of the remaining variables, see Table 4. For each 
independent variable, the first row reports the estimated coefficient and the second row reports the p-value. Coefficients were estimated based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors clustered by year and transaction. We controlled for country fixed-effects. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. 
